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Abstract
A questionnaire survey was conducted to explore how people think about inflation,
and what real problems they see it as causing. With results from 677 people,
comparisons were made among people in the U.S., Germany, and Brazil, between
young and old, and between economists and non-economists. Among noneconomists in all countries, the largest concern with inflation appears to be that it
lowers people’s standard of living. Non-economists appear often to believe in a sort
of sticky-wage model, by which wages do not respond to inflationary shocks,
shocks which are themselves perceived as caused by certain people or institutions
acting badly. This standard of living effect is not the only perceived cost of inflation among non-economists: other perceived costs are tied up with issues of
exploitation, political instability, loss of morale, and damage to national prestige.
The most striking differences between groups studied were between economists and
non-economists. There were also important international and intergenerational
differences. The US–Germany differences (on questions not just about information)
were usually less strong than the intergenerational differences.

*This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation and the National
Bureau of Economic Research. This paper was presented at the National Bureau of Economic
Research Conference on Monetary Policy and Low Inflation, Cheeca Lodge, Islamorada,
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Shapiro, Virginia Shiller, and participants in the Conference on Monetary Policy and Low
Inflation for helpful suggestions. Aslak Aunstrup, Mylene Chan, Paulo Freitas, John
Lippman, Chris Malloy, and Daniel Piazolo provided excellent research assistance.

Why Do People Dislike Inflation?
Robert J. Shiller

The purpose of this study is to try to understand, using public survey methods, why
people are so concerned and dismayed by inflation, the increase in the price level and
decline in value of money. Studying public attitudes towards inflation may help government policy makers better understand the reasons why they should (or should not)
be very concerned with controlling inflation, and may help the policy makers better
understand issues concerning exchange rate policies. A study of public attitudes
towards inflation may also help us learn whether differences across countries in
attitudes towards or understandings of inflation might explain any differences across
countries in inflationary outcomes.
I, with the help of several students, designed the surveys reported here to
discover in some detail what people see as the origins of inflation and what real
problems people see inflation as causing. Discovering this means asking a lot of
questions, to find out what things people associate with inflation, what theories they
have about the mechanism of inflation, what their information sets regarding inflation
are, and what their preferences are with regard to inflationary outcomes. One thing
stressed in this study is learning the kinds of models of inflation that people have,
ideas people have as to the causes of inflation and the mechanisms whereby inflation
has its effects. We shall see from the results that people have definite opinions about
the mechanisms and consequences of inflation, and that these opinions differ across
countries, between generations in both the US and Germany, and, even more
strikingly, between the general public and economists.
This paper begins, in Section I, with a characterization of the problem of defining
popular understandings of inflation. The first steps in this study, Section II, consisted
of informal interviews with people, attempting to learn directly from them what they
thought about inflation. Following these interviews, three questionnaires, Questionnaires A, B, and C, were designed, to be distributed to large groups of people to
allow some quantitative measure of the attitudes we thought we discerned in the
informal interviews (Section III). Questionnaire A was a short questionnaire, asking
people to write short answers in their own words. Questionnaire B was used to
compare a random sample of people in the US with professional economists, and
Questionnaire C was used for intergenerational and international comparisons. In
Section IV, the answers written by the respondents on Questionnaire A are described.
In Section V, the results about public concerns with inflation from Questionnaires B
and C are presented. The issues studied are the importance of inflation for the
standard of living, why people think inflation affects their standard of living, other
concerns besides the standard of living, psychological effects of inflation, concerns
1

that opportunists use inflation to exploit others, morale issues, concerns about political and economic chaos caused by inflation, and concerns about national prestige
and prestige of the currency. Differences are found across generations and across
countries and between economists and non-economists in some very basic assumptions about inflation. In Section VI, further analyzing Questionnaires B and C
results, I discuss some general notions about the origins of public opinions about
inflation and reasons why such opinions differ across groups of people. International
as well as intergenerational differences in information about inflation are documented. Evidence is given of the importance of perceptions that expert opinion
supports the public’s concern with inflation, and of public beliefs that there is a social
contract in which a commitment to fighting inflation is a requirement of all public
figures. In Section VII I conclude, offering broad interpretations of the results. The
Appendix discusses sample design and survey methods.

I. Defining the Problem: The Study of Inflation in
Popular Culture
The word “inflation” appears to be the most commonly used economic term among
the general public. Table 1 column 1 shows how often the word has been used, in
comparison with other economic terms, based on a computer search of news stories
in the ALLNWS (all news) section of the Nexis system, an electronic search system
for English language news publications (and including some broadcasts) around the
world. The word “inflation” appeared in 872,004 stories, far outnumbering the
stories containing any other economic term. 1 Only “unemployment” comes even
close, with 602,885 stories. The term “inflation” even outranks the word “sex,” for
which Nexis ALLNWS produced only 662,920 stories.

1

The coverage of the Nexis ALLNWS section gradually tapers off as one goes back in
time; many publications are indexed back to the early 1970s. A search for the word “inflation” as an indicator of public interest in consumer price inflation carries some risk: the word
has other uses as well. However, a sampling of the stories turned up by Nexis shows that the
great majority of the stories using the word “inflation” are talking about the phenomenon of
aggregate price increase. In a sample of 100 stories, 94 referred to the phenomenon of aggregate price increase. Two referred to specific price inflation, such as land price inflation, but
these stories also referred to aggregate inflation. Five of the 100 referred to figures “adjusted
for inflation,” but did not specifically say anything about the phenomenon of inflation. One
of the 100 referred to the inflation of automobile air bags.
2

Table 1
Number of Stories that Use Various Economic Terms
on Nexis General News Search Facility, Level 1

Inflation
Unemployment
Productivity
Infrastructure
Economic Growth
Poverty
Monopoly
Price Index
Communism
Price Increase
Money Supply
Diversification
Consumer Price
Index
Trade Barriers
Risk Management
Price Level
National Debt
Job Opportunities
Industrial Policy
Technological
Innovation
Public Investment
Real Interest Rate
International
Competitiveness

(1)
ALLNWS

(2)
CURNWS
(last 2 years)

872,004
602,885
376,775
331,888
322,888
316,995
231,370
179,911
150,000
147,877
104,498
89,034
74,054

255,987
161,939
103,507
148,354
106,354
114,190
72,103
50,278
35,139
35,115
24,005
21,300
21,096

59,101
46,979
38,086
37,771
36,816
24,316
15,971

18,053
19,646
8,130
11,818
12,129
5,433
4,638

15,946
15,447
15,170

5,137
3,710
3,949

(1)
ALLNWS
Public Goods
Economic
Efficiency
Deflation
Indexation
Productive Capacity
Income Distribution
Human Capital
Price Gouging
False Advertising
Cost of Living
Allowance
Market Incentives
Index Bonds
Externality
Potential Output
American Economic
Association
Game Theory
Economics
Profession
National Economic
Strategy
Real Business
Cycle(s)
Indexed Annuity

(2)
CURNWS
(last 2 years)

12,998
11,741

4,586
2,962

11,584
10,550
9,263
7,884
7,102
6,427
6,219
4,595

3,141
2,564
1,988
2,171
2,604
1,850
1,851
762

4,037
3,398
2,985
1,353
1,289

1,270
869
1,169
449
324

1,292
1,136

551
271

810

99

127

55

59

23

At this time of relatively low inflation among most of the major countries of the
world, “inflation” still appears to be the most commonly used economic term. The
Nexis system, using its current news section CURNWS that covers the last two years
only, still produced more stories using the word “inflation” than using any other
economic term, see Table 1 column 2.
Because the word “inflation” is so much a part of everyday lives, it has many
associations and connotations to ordinary people. Moreover, because shopping, and
thereby noticing prices, is an everyday activity for ordinary people, thinking about
prices is also a major part of people’s thinking, and the subject “inflation” is one of
great personal interest for most people.
Inflation, when it is substantial or shows the risk of becoming substantial, is
clearly perceived as a national problem of enormous proportions. This fact is also
evident in the constant attention that inflation is given in the media and in the
3

fundamental role it plays in many political elections. News about inflation seems to
have serious consequences for approval ratings of Presidents and for outcomes of
elections (see Cartwright and DeLorme, 1985; Parker, 1986; Golden and Poterba,
1980; Cuzan and Bundrick, 1992; and Fair, 1978, 1994). Public opinion polls have
shown that inflation (or something like inflation) has often been viewed as the most
important national problem. 2
The great public concern with inflation has certainly had an impact on the
economics profession. We must ask whether the extent of public concern with inflation really makes sense, or whether the economics profession has been influenced
from without into devoting too much attention to inflation.
Studying so complex a public concept as inflation will not be easy. To attempt
to learn about it at some depth, I have followed here a sequential procedure, involving first informal conversations with people, allowing me and my students to use
our judgment as much as possible, and then a questionnaire survey.

II. First Steps of this Study
I asked student research assistants to interview random people in the US and
Germany informally, with a list of suggested interview questions, and to give me
their impressions; I interviewed some people as well. I then discussed with these
students what people seemed to be saying.
When asked why they dislike inflation, people often protest that they are not
experts, and they need to be prodded to respond. When they do respond, it is often
with what seem to be incompletely thought out ideas, and vague associations about
inflation, yet a conviction that inflation is important. Most people seemed to be
vulnerable to fundamental confusions about inflation, and in spite of their convictions
as to the importance of inflation, seemed not to have given really serious thought to
it.
Several students came back to me independently of each other and told me, as
a result of their interviews, that it was very easy to see why people dislike inflation:
people think inflation erodes their standard of living. For example, my student,
Michael Krause, who interviewed in Germany wrote:
If you ask people in conversation why they think that people dislike inflation, everybody
says it is because of the increase in the cost of living, the fall in real income. This is
particularly relevant for those who live from pensions or social security transfers, where

2

The Gallup Poll has asked in the US since 1935 “What do you think is the most
important problem facing this country [or this section of the country] today?” Those citing
inflation or the high cost of living as the most important problem have generally represented
a significant percentage of respondents. The percentage was generally over 50% from 1973
to 1981, when inflation was higher than it is today.
4

inflation corrections lag behind (at least when the inflation rate has unexpectedly
increased). Several times I indicated that nominal incomes would be adjusted to
inflation. It was said that it was uncertain that an adjustment would take place, or when
it will take place, at least there is uncertainty about whether this adjustment would be
sufficient.

Conducting these interviews inclined us to a hypothesis that the main issue for
the public with regard to inflation is just that people do not see the connection between inflation and increases in income that might be associated with it. We must
try to understand why people would think that there might be little connection
between the inflation rate and the changes in their own income. Simple reflection on
the mechanism of inflation suggests that there are likely to be many people who
benefit from it, rather than be harmed by it, but no one reported hearing an
interviewee volunteer that he or she benefited from inflation. There is something of
a puzzle here why the answers should so uniformly assume that inflation is harmful
to the respondent.
Many other issues were also raised regarding inflation, issues that seemed to
suggest concerns along very different lines. Some of these appear potentially very
important too, even if people do not bring them up first in our conversations. These
other concerns will be described below in various questions. They may even turn out
to be the more important issues for policy makers, in trying to decide whether or how
much to fight inflation.

III. Questionnaire Design
To give quantitative force to our impressions about what people thought, various of
their ideas were put down on questionnaires, to be distributed to large samples of
people, who could indicate the extent of their agreement with these ideas.
I decided to use three questionnaires (Questionnaires A, B, and C) because there
were too many questions to expect any one respondent to answer them all with
patience and thoughtfulness. Separating the questions into three questionnaires also
gave us some opportunity to avoid suggesting ideas that might bias answers
elsewhere in the same questionnaire.
Questionnaire A was very short and emphasized open-ended questions where
respondents were given space to write a paragraph to answer. The questionnaire,
distributed to a random sample of people in the US, was so short that it occupied only
both sides of a single sheet of paper; the text of this questionnaire is reproduced in
its entirety in Table 2. The questionnaire was kept very short because we felt that
people could not be expected to write thoughtful answers if the questionnaire were
too long. By omitting from this questionnaire many of our other questions that we
could not pose without putting ideas into their heads, we get in this questionnaire
some fairly pure responses. The disadvantage of this questionnaire is that by not
putting ideas into respondents’ heads, we cannot well influence what people will
5

choose to talk about in their answers, and we may not learn what we want to learn
from them.
Questionnaire B was a longer questionnaire, six pages, three sheets on both sides,
with multiple choice questions aimed at basic concepts and theories about inflation.
This questionnaire was distributed both to a random sample in the US and to
economists, whose professional opinions were to be contrasted with those of the
public.
Questionnaire C was another six-page questionnaire with multiple choice
questions. It contained questions to elicit intergenerational and international
differences in attitudes towards inflation, and in public knowledge and popular ideas
about inflation. Questionnaire C was the only one translated into foreign languages.
It was distributed in the US in English, in Germany in German, and in Brazil (with
e-mail via Bras-net) in Portuguese.
Germany was selected because of its historical reputation as a country with
extreme inflation aversion and low historical inflation rates. Brazil was selected as
a country that has had a history of very high inflation and continues to have very high
(by US standards) inflation. The questionnaires included an age question; we
tabulate results separately here for older people in the US and Germany. There is a
popular theory that those who experienced the troubles in Germany around World
War II, or who were closer to the German hyperinflation of the early 1920s, are more
troubled by inflation, and we can with these results confirm whether this is so.
Results from all of the questionnaires should be interpreted with some caution.
There may be problems with translation; some of the words may be more loaded with
meanings, or have different connotations, in the different languages. Although we
used the backtranslation method to produce nearly identical questionnaires in English
and German, there are still potential problems. Moreover, even apart from the
translation problem, the questions often have multiple interpretations, as indicated
by some of the comments written on the questionnaires. One should be cautious in
interpreting apparent public agreement with a statement made on the questionnaire;
people might agree to a lot of things that are not really in their own minds, if in
reading them they merely feel they like the sound of them.
There are also issues of selection bias in our answers: we have responses only
from those who chose to answer. The selection bias issues are perhaps most important with questions about how important inflation is (people who think inflation
is important are more likely to fill out the questionnaire) and with questions about the
extent of public information (people who know more about inflation are more likely
to fill out the questionnaire). Selection bias is likely to be most extreme with our
Brazil results, since the Brazil survey was conducted using e-mail, whose users tend
to be young and, presumably, sophisticated; often they are students and faculty
currently living outside of Brazil. Time and budget constraints prevented our doing
a mail survey to a random sample in Brazil; it was decided to accept the higher risk
of selection bias rather than have no results from Brazil at all. I will indicate in some
6

places where I am particularly concerned with issues of interpretation and of
selection bias, but the reader is encouraged to keep these issues in mind at all times
in judging the results.
The standard errors of the sample proportions should also be kept in mind, so
that small differences in answers will not be overinterpreted. Recall that the standard
error for a sample proportion equal to 0.5 is, with 100 observations, 0.050, and with
50 observations, 0.071; the standard error for a sample proportion equal to 0.9 or 0.1
is, with 100 observations, 0.030, and with 50 observations, 0.042. Sample size here
is generally clearly adequate for broad statements about proportions, though we
should not make much of a difference, for example, between proportions of 0.5 in
one sample and 0.6 in another.

IV. Results with the Short Open-Ended Questionnaire
(Questionnaire A)
The short open-ended questionnaire (Table 2) distributed in the US only seems to
have succeeded in encouraging participants to give their concerns about inflation
without imposing much structure on their answers; people often wrote a lot. Often
there were substantial essays crammed onto the page, and reading responses does
seem to convey a picture of how people think about inflation. The answers to
multiple choice questions are tabulated in Table 2, along with the complete questionnaire, but the written answers, which can only be described incompletely here,
are perhaps more significant.
The results appear to confirm that most people think that inflation is an important
national policy issue: 92% strongly agreed or agreed somewhat in question A1.
Moreover, people report that they are interested in news reports on inflation: 89%
chose “very interesting” or “somewhat interesting” (question A2). Of course, these
results must be discounted somewhat, since there is likely a selection bias at work
here: people who are more interested in inflation are more likely to fill out the
questionnaire.
What is perhaps most significant is the reasons people give for being interested
in inflation news, question A3. They seem most often to be saying that they are
interested in inflation because they think it hurts their standard of living, although
they were usually not completely clear. I divided the answers (from the 105 people
who wrote something in answer to this question) into five categories: (a) those who
seemed to be trying to say directly that inflation hurts their standard of living (33%),
(b) those who referred to the fact that inflation lowers the buying power of the dollar
(responding essentially with the definition of inflation) (23%), (c) those who said just
that inflation is something one must know for planning and budget

7

Table 2
Text of Entire Questionnaire A
[With Results of 120 Questionnaires in Brackets]
Questionnaire: Opinions on Inflation
(A)
This is a questionnaire about your views on inflation. By inflation, we mean a steady increase of the
average of all prices, and thus of the price level.
A1. Do you think that controlling inflation should be a high priority for the US government and
its agencies? [Circle one number]
1. Yes, strongly agree
[59%]
[n = 118]
2. Yes, agree somewhat
[33%]
3. Neutral or no opinion
[1%]
4. No, disagree somewhat
[4%]
5. No, strongly disagree
[3%]
A2. Do you find, when you hear or see news stories about inflation, that you personally find these
stories interesting? [Circle one number]
1. Yes, very interesting
[47%]
[n = 119]
2. Yes, somewhat interesting
[42%]
3. No, or no opinion
[11%]
A3. Some people think that news about inflation is boring technical stuff, that they can’t relate to.
Can you explain to them why they should find it interesting? [space for answer]
A4. Do you have worries that if inflation rises too high, then something really bad might happen?
[Circle one number]
1. Yes, very much
[47%]
[n = 118]
2. Yes, somewhat
[43%]
3. No, or no opinion
[10%]
A5. If you answered yes to the above, what are you worried might happen? [space for answer]
A6. When inflation gets very high, what do you think is the reason? [space for answer]
A7. When you go to the store and see that prices are higher, do you sometimes feel a little angry
at someone? [Circle one number]
1. Yes, often
[38%]
[n = 20]
2. Yes, sometimes
[48%]
3. Never
[15%]
A8. [If you said yes above] Who do you tend to feel angry at and why? [space for answer]
A9. Think about how much your income (measured in dollars per month) went up (or down) in the
past five years. What do you think are the most important factors that account for the change
in your income? (Please try to list all the relevant factors that apply to you):
1. Income went up
[53%]
[n = 94]
2. Income went down
[47%]
A10. Try to imagine how things would be different if the United States had experienced higher
inflation over the last five years, so that prices of things you buy had risen to higher levels than
we actually see today. How different do you think your income (the total dollars you earn in
a month) would be now, in comparison with your actual income now, if we had had the higher
inflation? [Circle one number]
1. My income (in dollars per month) would be lower
[28%]
[n = 114]
2. My income (in dollars per month) would be about same.
[35%]
3. My income (in dollars per month) would be higher.
[31%]
4. No opinion.
[6%]
Thank you very much. Please return this questionnaire to Prof. Robert Shiller,
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT
06520–8281
Reference Number________
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purposes (8%), (d) those who said that inflation hurts the economy in general (10%),
and (e) those who only stated that inflation was important without giving reasons or
who wrote something that was only tangential to the question (26%).
Here are some excerpts from answers to question A3 that I categorized as
asserting that inflation hurts their standard of living, category A:
“It affects their life and lifestyle.”
“Inflation governs the way we live. It’s simple: raise the prices, get less for your
money.”
“Every individual is personally affected in his lifestyle, comfort, health, etc., by
whatever is happening about inflation. How can they not be interesting?”
“Inflation can rob a person of income”
“Their saving for retirement and college fund for their children will be evaporated when
they need them the most.”
“Inflation has a strong impact on an individual’s pocket book and on one’s standard of
living.”
“As a retired senior citizen, inflation has most definitely lowered my purchasing power.”
“It affects everyone’s standard of living and their lives.”
“Because it is directly related to their income.”
“Because it affects the wages they receive & the price they pay for houses, cars,
groceries & everything else they buy. In short, it affects their standard of living.”
“Our very being depends on this.”
“Right now it is killing US.”

Here are some excerpts from answers to question A3 that I put in category B as
asserting little more than that inflation lowers the buying power of the dollar:
“Inflation reflects everyday prices of all goods, services, and products.”
“I have a simple statement: inflation is directly related to your pocketbook”

Although these answers are sometimes perhaps nothing more than restatements of the
definition of inflation, it would seem that these statements, entered in answer to a
question why inflation news is interesting, suggest that the respondent feels that
inflation erodes his or her income. That this is the meaning of these statements is
suggested by the answers in category A that include sentences like these as well.
It is possible, on the other hand, that not all of the category B answers imply that
the standard of living is generally eroded by inflation, only that one must be
knowledgeable about it to live within a budget. There were a few answers that
seemed to say that knowing the inflation rate is helpful in planning, category C.
Some excerpts from these answers to question A3 are:
9

“Inflation rate is a gauge to measure the value of today’s dollar against its value in time
to come, and also, the true return on investments. It is necessary knowledge in future
planning.”
“Inflation is the barometer for your pocketbook. Certainly, it is important in gauging
your spending. I would explain that inflation or deflation affects your spending and
savings directly. Therefore, you should know the inflation rate at all times.”
“People need to learn fast due to economic world change rapidly and it is the most keen
fact that influences their own life. Just makes it easier to understand.

Here are some answers to question A3 that I categorized as suggesting systemic
problems of inflation, more than just the direct effect of higher prices on their ability
to buy, category D:
“It is an indicator of future events to occur economically.”
“The stability of the economy is important, as it facilitates one’s ability to buy and save.
A stable economy encourages investment and growth.”

There were, however, few of such answers.
The impression that people are worried about the effects of inflation on their
standards of living is further supported by their responses to questions A4 and A5.
In answering question A4, whether they are worried that something really bad might
happen if inflation rises too high, 90% said yes very much or yes somewhat. What
is striking is the dramatic nature of some of the answers to the following question,
question A5, about just what bad might happen.
The most common answers concerned fears of depression and/or dramatic drop in
overall standard of living:
“That I, and millions like me, will be forced into poverty – perhaps not like the “great
depression,” but close.”
“If inflation rises too high, more people will be forced to seek assistance, e.g., welfare,
food stamps, charity, etc.
“We wouldn’t be able to afford anything. Our wages wouldn’t be high enough.”
“I will not be able to live within my weekly paycheck.”
“There will be more homeless and starving people.”

A few reported fears of political instability:
“1. Political nightmare, 2. riot, 3. big incidents”
“Hyperinflation can cause governments to fall and individuals’ savings may be lost
causing chaos throughout the land.”

A few reported general fears of damage to the economy:
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“High inflation affects all aspects of business and investing. It is unhealthy for business,
failures will result.”
“If too high the economy would collapse.”
“A financial collapse, followed by a depression.”

A few seemed perhaps to refer to the effects on their pension checks or other
investments:
“I will not have enough money to manage my older years independently”
“Buying power in retirement might be significantly reduced at a point where a relatively
fixed income would occur.”
“People on fixed incomes would be hard pressed to meet mortgage payments or car
payments or even rent.”

A few spoke of changes in the income distribution:
“Increase in people with high levels of income. Decrease in number of people in
middle-class levels of income. Increase in number of people in poverty levels of
income.”
“That the gap between the rich and the poor will become so great that there will no
longer be a middle income group or even the potential of one.”

Answers to the next question, question A6 asking them to list the causes of
inflation, reveal that people haven’t any clear sense what is causing inflation, there
are very many different factors that they think might be responsible. The most
common cause cited was “greed.” The word “greed” or “greedy” was volunteered by
17 (or 16%) of the respondents. There were also a lot of nonspecific references to
the government as a cause (16 respondents). The next most commonly mentioned
cause was that people borrow or spend too much (11 respondents), and after that the
Federal Reserve and interest rates (10 respondents), big business and corporate
profits, (nine respondents), followed by the money supply increase (eight respondents), government deficit (seven respondents), politicians in general (five
respondents), high demand (four respondents) and welfare (three respondents).
Causes cited by one or two respondents each included cost increases, lack of price
controls or regulation, the dollar decline, unemployment, lack of saving by the public,
hoarding of goods, the shrinking middle class, the rest of the world, shortages, labor
unions, management caves in to wage demands, taxes too high, fraud and corruption,
overconfidence in the continuing inflation, balance of payments, corporate executives
overpaid, Republicans in power, and just plain stupidity. 3
While people appear to be in great disagreement why inflation occurs, they do
3

Katona (1975) also concluded that the public has no clear ideas as to the causes of
inflation.
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tend nonetheless to be angry at someone when they see prices rise: in answer to
question A7, 38% reported feeling angry often, and an additional 48% reported
feeling angry sometimes. There was little agreement on the answer to the next
question, question A8, on who they are angry at. The government was mentioned by
18 respondents, manufacturers by 15 respondents, store owners by 6, business in
general by 6, wholesalers by 4, executives by 3, the US congress by 3, and greedy
people by 3. Also mentioned were institutions, economists, retailers, distributors,
middlemen, conglomerates, the President of the United States, the Democratic Party,
big money people, store employees (for wage demands), “my employer” (for not
increasing my salary), and myself (for being ignorant of matters).
Question A9, in which the respondent is asked to list all relevant factors in
explaining how his or her income changed in the last five years, was inspired by a
report of Katona (1975, p. 140) that people tend to see the causes of their income
increases in personal terms, rather than as due to inflation:
. . . survey respondents with gains in income were asked the puzzling question, “How
come that you make more than five years ago?” In reply, most people spoke of their own
accomplishments and progress. Only a very small proportion referred to inflation.

Question A9 was included to see if we can confirm his report, but we are operating
under a handicap in doing so at the end of this questionnaire: the question is asked
here following eight questions about inflation, which surely ought to put the idea of
inflation in people’s minds. Still, only 16 of 47 who wrote an answer, 34%,
mentioned inflation, which seems an important omission in a five-year period when
prices went up 13%. Of course, it is probably true that for most people the most
important factor accounting for income change in this interval was not inflation, and
the tendency for most people to omit mention as among the leading factors of it might
be forgiven.
What is more striking are the answers to the hypothetical question, question A10,
about what would have happened to incomes had their been more inflation. People
seem to have no idea: answers are about equally distributed around the three possibilities, income would be lower, income would be about the same, and income
would be higher. From the answers to this question, it would appear that there is
practically no recognition of a response of income to inflation, and thus there would
appear to be a strong presumption that inflation hurts real incomes.
It is worthwhile noting what things were not mentioned, or only rarely mentioned, on a questionnaire that gave plenty of space for people to write open-ended
answers. Not a single respondent volunteered anywhere on the questionnaire that he
or she benefitted from inflation. There was little mention of nominal contracts; only
four respondents mentioned these on the questionnaire. There appeared to be little
mention of the fact that inflation redistributed income from creditors to debtors; only
one respondent clearly stated this. Not a single respondent clearly mentioned,
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anywhere on the questionnaire, the inconveniences created by inflation, such as
making more trips to the bank.

V. Public Concerns with Inflation: Results with Questionnaires
B and C
V.1. Confirmation of Importance of Inflation and Its Effects on Standards
of Living
Answers to some of the questions on Questionnaire B (distributed to randomly
selected people in the US and to economists) and Questionnaire C (distributed to
randomly selected people in the US and Germany, and via e-mail in Brazil) confirm
the central importance in public perceptions of inflation and of the standard of living
concern. These closed-end questionnaires give more precise description of our
conclusions, since the wording of the answers is the same for everyone (they must
choose among our answers), and allows accurate comparisons across groups.
The respondents in all three countries, and among both the younger and the older
in the US and Germany, were very concerned with inflation: 4
C1. Do you agree with the following statement? “The control of inflation is one of the most
important missions of US [German, Brazilian] economic policy.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
56%
28%
7%
7%
2%
n = 123
born < 1940
69%
13%
11%
4%
2%
n = 45
born 1950–
44%
38%
2%
13%
2%
n = 45
Germany All
76%
18%
5%
1%
0%
n = 174
born < 1940
90%
8%
1%
1%
0%
n = 77
born 1950–
51%
40%
7%
2%
0%
n = 55
Brazil
56%
32%
2%
4%
7%
n = 57

Concerns with inflation are high everywhere. The Germans tend to agree with this
statement more often than the others, but it is striking that no group of respondents
chose 1 or 2 less than 80% of the time.5 The older people (born before 1940) were
4

When words appear in square brackets in the questions shown here, we mean that the
word corresponding to the country of the respondent is used.
5

The breakdown of categories by birth year was chosen so that the older group would
be people who clearly experienced World War II and the post World War II inflation in
Germany, and the younger group would be people who are clearly excluded from either
group, but included in the figures from the “All” group, along with people who refused to
reveal their age on the questionnaire.
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more likely to agree fully than the younger people (born in 1950 or later). The
differences between German and US respondents are much stronger for the older
group than for the younger group; this is a pattern that will recur in answers to other
questions below. Note that our Brazilian sample of e-mail users is approximately
comparable in age to our younger group: 91% of our Brazilian respondents were
born in 1950 or later. There is not a large difference between the Brazilians and the
younger German or US respondents in answers to this question.
Another way to gauge public concern with inflation, and to see whether there are
international differences in this concern, is to ask them whether they would accept
inflation if it were necessary in order to curb unemployment, that is, to ask them how
they would choose between two points on a Phillips curve. This question presumes
the existence of a Phillips Curve tradeoff, and so is asking directly about preferences
with regard to inflation and unemployment:
C8. Imagine that you faced a choice for the United States [Germany, Brazil] between the following
two extreme possibilities, which would you choose?
1. The US [Germany, Brazil] would have in the next 10 years an inflation rate of only 2% a
year, but an unemployment rate of 9%, thus about 12 million [3.5 million, 6 million]
unemployed.
2. The US [Germany, Brazil] would have in the next ten years an inflation rate of 10% a month,
but an unemployment rate of only 3%, thus about 4 million [1.2 million, 2 million]
unemployed.
1
2
US All
75%
25%
n = 113
born < 1940
79%
21%
n = 38
born 1950–
72%
28%
n = 43
Germany All
72%
28%
n = 153
born < 1940
66%
34%
n = 65
born 1950–
84%
16%
n = 49
Brazil
54%
46%
n = 50

The results show that most people in all countries would choose the low inflation
even if it meant that millions more people would be unemployed. The Brazilians
more often choose 2 than people in other countries, possibly since having lived
through it they have learned ways of enduring it, and possibly also since Brazil does
not have as developed a social safety net for the unemployed. But there is less
difference across countries in answers to this question than I expected. There is little
difference between the German and US respondents overall, and so the popular
theory that Germans have a greater distaste for inflation is not confirmed here. The
difference between the age groups within Germany is much bigger than the difference overall between Germany and the US. The absence of a large difference
between the German and US respondents suggests that the differences between the
two countries might be more in their understandings of the unemployment consequences of inflation, rather than differences in pure preferences regarding inflation.
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While the general public appears to dislike inflation everywhere, results from the
B questionnaire show that economists do not generally agree:
B1. Do you agree that preventing high inflation is an important national priority, as important as
preventing drug abuse or preventing deterioration in the quality of our schools?
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
52%
32%
4%
8%
4%
n = 117
Economists
18%
28%
11%
26%
18%
n = 80

The fraction of our US respondents who fully agreed was nearly three times as high
as the fraction of economists who fully agreed. This question also shows some
indication of the magnitude of the public concern with inflation; with about half of
the public choosing 1, one might say that the problem of high inflation appears to be
viewed by the public (though not economists) as on par with the drug problem or the
problems of our schools.
In confirming that people think that inflation is a very important issue, it is
helpful to see whether people see the inflation process, the surprise in inflation, as
causing a problem, or the effects of the new price level itself. One way of giving
information on this is to ask people if they would like to go back to earlier prices if
they could:
B18.

Do you agree with the following statement? “If the government were to make a mistake next
year, such as printing too much money, and creates prices that are 20% higher than they are
today, I think that they should try to reverse their mistake, and bring prices back down where
they are today.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
46%
22%
22%
4%
6%
n = 113
Economists
0%
3%
5%
28%
64%
n = 76

There is here a very sharp difference between the economist’s answers and the
public’s: the public seems to be at odds with the fundamental economists’ notion
that we should accept base drift in the price level.
Why is there such a difference between the economics profession and the general
public about the importance of inflation or price level changes? The general public
in the US clearly thinks differently from professional economists about the costs of
inflation, far more likely to think of inflation as lowering standards of living:
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B9. Which of the following comes closer to your biggest gripe about inflation:
1. Inflation causes a lot of inconveniences: I find it harder to comparison shop, I feel I have
to avoid holding too much cash, etc.
2. Inflation hurts my real buying power, it makes me poorer.
3. Other:
1
2
3
US All
7%
77%
15% n = 110
Economists
49%
12%
40% n = 78

Over six times as many in the general public chose 2, that inflation hurts real buying
power; indicating that economists think in very different terms about inflation. One
may conjecture that the favored answer from economists here reflects concerns about
the process of inflation, the frictions that accompany it, rather than the change in the
price level itself, while the favored answer from the general public would reflect
suffering caused by the new higher price level in the face of fixed nominal incomes.
Consistent with this popular impression that inflation hurts standards of living,
the general public tends to see inflation as hurting most people, while economists see
about 50% as being hurt (50% would be the fraction hurt if inflation caused a random
redistribution of income among people): 6
B5. What percent of the population do you think is hurt when there is sudden, unexpected, high
inflation?
%
US All
Economists

69% (mean)
48%

n = 108
n = 73

The majority among the general public in all the countries studied here except
Brazil fully agrees that high inflation can reduce the growth and economic progress
of a country:
C11. Do you agree with the following statement? “Inflation rates over 30% to 40% a year can
reduce the growth and economic progress of a country, especially in comparison with
countries where inflation is under 5% a year.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
57%
30%
7%
3%
3%
n = 122
born < 1940
67%
24%
7%
0%
2%
n = 45
born 1950–
48%
34%
9%
5%
5%
n = 44
Germany All
69%
19%
9%
1%
1%
n = 173
born < 1940
78%
11%
9%
0%
3%
n = 76
born 1950–
60%
33%
5%
2%
0%
n = 55
Brazil
40%
28%
12%
9%
11%
n = 57

6

Katona (1975) tabulated a similar question to the general public.
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Note that the opinion that inflation harms economic growth is weakest among the
Brazilians, but even among the Brazilians, 68% chose either 1 or 2 among the above.7
Full agreement with this statement is a little higher for the German than the US
respondents, and higher for older people in both countries.
V.2. Why Do People Think Inflation Hurts Their Standard of Living?
To understand why the general public thinks inflation hurts their standard of living,
let us first recognize that we cannot get a good understanding until we learn what
people think causes inflation. Inflation is best regarded as an endogenous variable,
which reflects a number of causal forces just as does the standard of living, and so
we may not view inflation as itself the ultimate cause of anything.
We saw from our questionnaire A results that people cite a wide variety of causes
of inflation, no single cause. Although the disagreement about the causes of inflation
seemed to be so high that it is difficult to make any general statement about what
people are thinking, the public often seemed ready to put down inflation as caused
by bad behaviors, motivated by greed or other low impulse. Respondents described
inflation as caused by big businesses pursuing profits, the Fed erroneously increasing
the money supply, people borrowing or spending too much, the politicians letting the
government deficit get out of hand. If there is any common story about causes of
inflation among many of these people, it would seem to be that the causes are tied up
with people acting badly. There is a tone of moral indignation when people tell of
businesses trying too hard to pursue profits, the Fed behaving stupidly, people trying
to live above one’s means, or politicians trying too hard to get reelected. It is
important to realize this, since some economists have speculated that when people
speak of inflation they mean nothing more than the decline of the standard of living
itself, such as might have been caused by a negative technology shock or an oil price
increase. I should admit, though, that my conclusion about the nature of these causes
is due to my rather subjective interpretation of written answers.
7

In a pilot study for this paper, as part of another survey of a random sample of US
institutional money managers in the Spring of 1995, I asked:
1. What effect do you think a strongly and steadily inflationary national policy would have on longrun economic growth? Please answer by writing in the change in the growth rate of U.S. Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) that would accrue if we allowed the consumer price index inflation rate
to rise above 10% and left it above 10% for a long time. If you think that real economic growth
would be x% less per year, write –x%. If you think that real income growth would be x% more
per year, write +x%. If you think that there would be no change, write 0:
Change in annual real GDP growth rate: _________%

There were 75 respondents to this question; the median answer was –2%. Thus, this sample
of people expected that inflation can have a very serious impact on growth.
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But, if we accept this interpretation of the public’s ideas about causes of inflation, why do people think that inflationary shocks from these causes hurt their
standard of living? Perhaps their thinking arises just from an observed correlation,
that inflation tends to come at times when other factors were harming their standard
of living, and so people are influenced by the perceived correlation between inflation
and their problems. The oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 apparently precipitated
both inflation and recession and, occurred at a time of an end to the uptrend of productivity in many countries, yet people may not remember the oil price shock as a
cause, thinking instead of the inflation. The German hyperinflation of the early
1920s, an event widely alleged to have shaped German public opinion regarding
inflation, occurred at a time of heavy reparation payments, as the German government resorted to inflationary finance to make the reparation payments, and Germans
may have confused the lowered standard of living due to the export of real resources
as reparations with a consequence of inflation itself.
But, any such impressions as to correlations between inflation and other economic variables would not translate well into impressions of causality from inflation
to the other variables were there not some kind of model, some kind of story, that
inclines people to see inflation as causing declines in living standards. Some clues
as to the nature of such popular stories, or, let us say, popular models of the economy,
emerged from our discussions with people, and led us to formulate questions about
them.
An important factor that emerged from our conversations is that most people
seem to fail to think of the models that come naturally to economists about the competitive pressures that shape their wages and salaries; they tend to see any feedback
of inflation on wages and salaries as working through the goodwill (or lack thereof)
of their employer. This was confirmed by the answers to the following question:
B12. Please evaluate which of the following theories about the effects of general inflation on wages
or salary relates to your own experience and your own job: [Circle one number]
1. The price increase will create extra profits for my employer who can now sell output for
more; there will be no effect on my pay. My employer will see no reason to raise my pay.
2. Competition among employers will cause my pay to be bid up. I could get outside offers
from other employers, and so, to keep me, my employer will have to raise my pay too.
3. A sense of fairness and proper behavior will cause my employer to raise my pay.
4. None of the above or no opinion.
1
2
3
4
US All
26%
11%
21%
43%
n = 112
Economists
4%
60%
11%
25%
n = 75

Only 11% of the US respondents chose 2, that, in effect, market forces will cause a
raise in pay, while 60% of the economists chose this.
People do not tend to see inflation as process that naturally tends to affect wages
and salaries as well as goods prices. In one of our conversations; a respondent said
she always had deep worries about real income after hearing some long-term
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projection of prices. I thought that economists probably have a very different perspective on the significance of such long-term projections, and the comparison of the
public with economists on the following question bears this out:
B6. Do you agree with the following statement? “When I see projections about how many times
more a college education will cost, or how many times more the costs of living will be in
coming decades, I feel a sense of uneasiness; these inflation projections really make me worry
that my own income will not rise as much as such costs will.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
66%
20%
7%
6%
1%
n = 116
Economists
5%
15%
9%
30%
41%
n = 80

It is hard to imagine more striking difference between two groups of respondents than
we observe here: only 5% of the economists agreed fully with this statement, while
66% of the US respondents did.
The tendency of economists to see a much more tenuous connection between
inflation and the development of real wages led me to suppose that economists would
tend much more than the public to agree in the following question:
B7. Do you agree with the following statement? “Inflation is a sort of units of measurement thing
and little more: the dollar is a yardstick by which we measure value, and the length of this
yardstick (value of the dollar) is changing through time. All we have to do is make sure we are
taking full account of the length of the yardstick, and inflation will have little effect on us.
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
12%
8%
32%
20%
27%
n = 114
Economists
23%
28%
6%
27%
15%
n = 78

Over half the economists chose one or two here, while only 20% of the public did.
A similar question was asked on the C questionnaire, to allow international
comparisons of the notion that inflation is expected to be corrected:
C5. Do you agree with the following statement? “It makes no sense to pay attention to the
development of the inflation rate, because a pretty accurate inflation correction in my income
is to be expected anyway.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
2%
1%
3%
30%
65%
n = 122
born < 1940
5%
0%
5%
30%
61%
n = 44
born 1950–
0%
2%
2%
20%
75%
n = 44
Germany All
5%
4%
11%
11%
69%
n = 169
born < 1940
7%
5%
14%
7%
68%
n = 74
born 1950–
2%
0%
9%
13%
76%
n = 54
Brazil
0%
0%
5%
25%
70%
n = 57
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There is a striking tendency to disagree that inflation corrections can be expected in
all countries sampled.
People tend to think that their income may not be corrected for inflation, at least
for many years:
C6. Imagine that next year the inflation rate unexpectedly doubles. How long would it probably
take, in these times, before your income is increased enough so that you can afford the same
things as you do today? In other words, how long will it be before a full inflation correction
in your income has taken place? [Please mark only one answer.]
1. Up to a month
2. Until the next negotiation with my employer within a year
3. Several years
4. Never will be restored
5. Do not know
1
2
3
4
5
US All
0%
7%
39%
42%
11%
n = 123
born < 1940
0%
2%
36%
48%
14%
n = 44
born 1950–
0%
11%
44%
33%
11%
n = 45
Germany All
0%
8%
40%
40%
12%
n = 171
born < 1940
0%
8%
41%
35%
16%
n = 74
born 1950–
0%
5%
40%
42%
13%
n = 55
Brazil
2%
19%
17%
28%
34%
n = 53

Over three quarters of respondents in all groups in both the US and Germany chose
3 or 4, that it will take years for real income to be restored or that it will never be
restored. Even in Brazil, with its indexation, 45% chose 3 or 4.
Of course, the hypothetical question asked here — concerning a sudden change
in the inflation rate — raises difficult intertemporal issues that a careful answerer
might find challenging. In fact, the inflation rate is changing all the time, and it
would seem that there must be times when there is no inflation but wages are
increasing to catch up to past inflation, so that wages may be increasing because of
inflation even when there is no inflation. The public probably lacks the quantitative
skills to model the response of their pay to inflation, which economists might cast in
terms of distributed lags or the like. There may be little to be gained by trying
different versions of this question, with different hypothetical time paths of inflation,
since the public cannot easily answer any such questions, beyond just giving some
vague impressions that the pay will substantially fall behind.
The notion that wages lag behind prices is very old: as early as 1895 it was
stated that:
The prices of what wage earners have to buy respond far more promptly to changes in
the quantity of money than do wages — the prices at which labor is sold. Hence,
whenever money is getting better, though nominal wages may tend to decrease, wage
earners are constantly getting more goods in exchange for the money they actually get
for their labor; and whenever money is getting poorer, though nominal wages may tend
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to increase, wage earners are constantly getting less of the necessaries and comforts of
life in return for the wages they receive. (Warner, 1895)

General Domingo Péron, the Argentinean populist dictator, had a colorful way of
describing this hypothesis: “Until now, prices have gone up the elevator, and wages
have had to use the stairs” (quoted by Cavallo, 1983). (He sought to reverse the
situation.)
Whether this wage lag hypothesis is valid was the subject of discussion of many
economists in the early to mid parts of this century; the outcome of the discussion
was essentially that there was no evidence for the hypothesis. Claims for evidence
in support of the wage lag hypothesis were vigorously challenged by Alchian and
Kessel (1960) and Cargill (1969). Bach and Stephenson (1974) found that periods
of higher inflation 1950–71 tended to be periods when wages as a share of national
income rose, rather than fell. Of course, the general public cannot be expected to
know of this research.
Most professional economists today are probably well aware from experience
that it is difficult to estimate the lag of incomes on prices from the data, and are likely
to imagine that actual relations are complicated and elusive. Economists are familiar
with long time-series plots showing the consumer price index and other nominal
series marching up through the years in seeming tandem. We are accustomed to
expecting that, over long time periods of substantial inflation as economists define
it, other things equal, any nominal series would move overall pretty much like the
aggregate price level. The general public has not had much experience of studying
time series economic data.
One notion that we thought that we discerned among some of the people we
talked with is some idea that people will always be behind when there is inflation,
because their wages are fair only on the time of the year when their wages are set, and
that they will fall behind within the year. We had great difficulty in formalizing this
into a question that people would understand, but did include the following on the
B questionnaire:
B13. Think about times when your income for next year is decided by your employer (or your last
employer, if you are no longer employed). Which of the following do you think is closer to
what your employer does:
1. “I think that my employer has in mind, to the extent that fairness is a consideration,
making my wage higher at the beginning than would seem fair and equitable, in
comparison with prices and other people’s wages, to allow for the fact that prices and
other people’s wages will rise through the year due to inflation, in order that my wage is
still reasonably fair and equitable later in the year.”
2. “I think that my employer has in mind, to the extent that fairness is a consideration,
making my wage fair and equitable at the beginning of the year, despite the fact that
inflation will make it compare somewhat unfavorably later in the year.”
3. Neither or no opinion.
1
2
3
US All
12%
26%
62%
n = 110
Economists
14%
30%
55%
n = 76
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Most of the responses were neither or no opinion, but there is a suggestion that our
impressions from our conversations were right, since of those who did answer the
question, most chose 2 over 1, meaning that they think that they have a fair wage
only at the time of the year when wages are set. The implication is that higher
inflation means real wages will be on average less fair.
V.3. It’s Not Just Standard of Living: Other Important Concerns
About Inflation
The results until now would suggest that the public is concerned with inflation
primarily because of its presumed effect on their standard of living, and that this
concern is substantially due to ill-conceived ideas of the lagged effects of inflation
on wages and salaries. But, there appear to be much more concerns than just such
effects of inflation on real income.
That there are other important concerns is shown by the answer to question B2,
which followed immediately question B1 on the B questionnaire, which was the
question about whether preventing inflation is as important a national priority as
preventing drug abuse or preventing deterioration in the quality of our schools:
B2. (If you circled 1 or 2 in the preceding question) Would you still agree if the type of inflation
being prevented caused incomes to rise at the same rate as prices, so that the inflation would
have no effect on living standards?
1. Yes, I would still agree in the preceding question.
2. No, I would disagree in the preceding question.
1
2
US All
83%
17%
n = 92
Economists
84%
16%
n = 56

Most of the public, and the economists, agree that preventing inflation would still be
such an important national priority.
It is interesting, too, that when presented with a similar pair of questions about
unemployment, we get analogous responses:
B3. Do you agree that preventing economic recessions, (times of high unemployment and low sales
for business) is an important national priority, as important as preventing drug abuse or
preventing deterioration in the quality of our schools?
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
55%
25%
8%
8%
4%
n = 114
Economists
38%
38%
8%
15%
3%
n = 80
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B4. (If you circled 1 or 2 in the preceding question) Would you still agree if you were told that the
method of preventing economic recessions had an absolutely equal impact on economic booms
(times with lots of job opportunities, and lots of sales for firms), preventing really good times
just as much as it prevented really bad times?
1. Yes, I would still agree in the preceding question.
2. No, I would disagree in the preceding question.
1
2
US All
83%
17%
n = 92
Economists
84%
16%
n = 56

We had conjectured that most public desire for economic stabilization policy was
formed from an impression that such policy can promote a higher average level of
income, and we thought that most in the public would not agree on B4. However,
both economists and the general public are generally supportive of stabilization
policy that is just that, preventing really good times just as much as really bad times.
Answers to another question reveal that a substantial minority of the public
(though not economists) would like to see inflation contained even if it meant a major
reduction in economic growth:
B11. Do you agree with the following statement? “Keeping inflation low is so high a priority that
I would not like to see a national policy that caused the inflation rate to double from where it
is today even if that policy were sure to double the real (inflation-corrected) growth rate of the
economy.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
21%
15%
38%
18%
10%
n = 114
Economists
4%
3%
5%
17%
71%
n = 79

If there are other concerns about the effects of inflation than just the effects on
real incomes, what are they? The other concerns explored here were concerns about
the psychological effects of inflation, the use of inflation by opportunists to take
advantage of others, the moral and morale effects of inflation, the effects of inflation
on political stability, and the effects of inflation and currency depreciation on
national prestige.
V.4. Psychological Effects of Inflation
Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1994), based on experimental evidence of various
sorts, found that people seemed to base their sense of satisfaction in their earnings
partly on nominal earnings, rather than just on real earnings, this is a form of “money
illusion.” I tried to replicate their results in a very unsubtle way, that of merely asking
people directly about the Shafir–Diamond–Tversky premise. If people answered as
if they were unaware of such an effect, it would not be evidence contrary to their
premise; such feelings may be subconscious or difficult to express. However, people
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(excluding economists) did not report that they were unaware of such feelings:
B17. Do you agree with the following statement? “I think that if my pay went up I would feel more
satisfaction in my job, more sense of fulfillment, even if prices went up just as much.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
28%
21%
11%
14%
27%
n = 112
Economists
0%
8%
3%
13%
77%
n = 79

The public’s answers here are spread all over the range from 1 to 5, but one
might say that the fact that about half of the US–All sample picked 1 or 2 reveals
some perceived benefits of inflation, rather than costs. 8 But connected with this
feeling there may be some perception that the apparent satisfaction is illusory or the
result of tricks:
“Inflation is like a narcotic. For a while it puts us in a high mood, glorifies the world,
and helps us forget our problems, but an awakening follows inevitably.” (Karl Schiller,
1970).9

This leads us into a consideration of the possibility that there is some concern among
the public that inflation is a sort of deception, or that it facilitates deception by some
people.
V.5. The Use of Inflation by Opportunists to Exploit Others
Popular discussions suggest that people apparently dislike inflation because it enables
people to play tricks on them:
“Only a healthy money is an honest money” (Otmar Emminger, 1979). 10
“In a society that wants to give a lot of room to individual freedom and responsibility,
the stability of the value of the currency represents principles and values like security of
one’s rights, honesty, credibility, and consistency, and so represents what is generally

8
Consistent with this interpretation of the answers to B17, it has been found that
consumption expenditures respond positively to inflation, see Branson and Klevorick (1969).
9

Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer, Zitate zur Stabilitätspolitik, Bonn,
December 1990, p. 21 (our translation). Schiller was German Economics Minister 1966– and
Finance Minister 1971–2, and was architect of the Stabilitätsgesetz (stabilization law) 1967.
10

Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer, Zitate zur Stabilitätspolitik, Bonn,
December 1990, p. 20 (our translation). Emminger is the author of many books on the DMark and the international monetary system.
24

expressed by the word Währung (currency)” (Sachverständigenrat, 1967). 11

That inflation gives opportunities for some to take unfair or dishonest advantage
of others is clearly a concern in the US. I tried to ask about such concern in a rather
more concrete way than is suggested by the above quotes, asking about specific
examples of such bad behavior:
B10. Do you agree with the following statement? “One of the most important things I don’t like
about inflation is that the confusion caused by price changes enables people to play tricks on
me, at my expense. For example, my boss can “forget” to raise my pay, and, if (s)he does,
then I am taking a real pay cut. The government can ‘forget’ to change the tax brackets, and
so I wind up paying higher taxes.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
51%
21%
11%
11%
6%
n = 113
Economists
28%
33%
9%
16%
15%
n = 80

This statement apparently struck a sympathetic chord among the public, and
moreover the economists tended to agree with it, though less strongly.
V.6. Moral or Morale Effects of Inflation
That somehow national morale, or a sense of moral behavior in others, is
compromised by inflation seemed to be a factor in our informal discussions with the
public. There is also a suggestion of such a factor in the popular press. For example,
in the February 1995 Reader’s Digest, the lead article by Jude Wanniski and
reprinted from the Wall Street Journal, entitled “You Call This a Good Economy?”
was substantially an article about inflation and its relations to morality or morale.
The Reader’s Digest is the most widely read magazine in the world, with 28 million
copies sold each month, and so the editors appear to have a good sense about what
interests the general public; it is significant that they chose this article as the lead
article in the issue, and even to offer, at the end of the article, reprints in bulk. One
must try to read this sympathetically, to try to understand why this article was
regarded by the editors of Reader’s Digest as so noteworthy. The tone of the article
is inspirational, as if the writer was pointing out some sham or temptation, and
exhorting us to keep our senses and values about us.
11

Loc.cit. We did not translate the word Währung here, since we think it has
untranslatable connotations. The word “Währung” is usually translated as “currency,” and
yet the word has connotations of “quality,” “value,” or “guarantee,” not shared by the English
word currency. The impression that inflation is a thing to be avoided seems to have infiltrated
German thinking in subtle ways. (The Sachverständigenrat is a German governmentappointed standing blue-ribbon panel that provides advice about major national issues.)
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This article is especially noteworthy for us, since it appears to contain
substantially more than just a claim that inflation has caused a decline in our standard
of living. The article dwells at some length on prices themselves. One might think
that long-run inflation paths would be a boring topic for most people; inflation has
to do with changes in units of measurements, a seemingly dry academic topic.
Wanniski (1995, pp. 49–51) enlivens the topic by interspersing words with moral
tone among recollections about price changes:
In the period between 1950 and 1970 it was the rule — rather than the exception —
that an ordinary family, without higher education, could sustain itself decently on the
income of a single breadwinner. In 1955, when I was 19 and living in Brooklyn, N.Y.,
my father, who had a sixth-grade education, maintained our family of five on a wage of
$82 a week as a bookbinder. My mother taught us fairness and compassion; my father,
discipline and enterprise.
With my younger brother and sister, we lived in a small apartment in a relatively
new building. The monthly rent in 1954 was under $90, gas and electricity another $7
to $10. We had a 1949 Plymouth that my father had bought new for $1200.
My first good suit, bought for my 1954 high-school graduation, was $30. In the
summer of 1950 I worked as an office boy on Wall Street for 75 cents an hour, the
minimum wage. In the summers from 1951 to 1953, I labored in the bindery for $1 an
hour, with time and a half for overtime. . . .
Where did this good economy go? It was inflated away.

The story goes on, with many more prices from that time quoted. An economist may
ask, what is the point of this personal history and list of prices from the 1950s?
One conceivable exegesis of the long list of prices in the Reader’s Digest passage
is the purely economic one that the author is reminding ignorant readers that if both
prices and wages are low, then one’s living standard isn’t affected by their lowness.
This point may well be contained in the passage, but it is clearly not the motivation
for including this list of prices. If this were only an article about units of measurement, then it would be no more interesting to readers than an article reminding
people about the relation between metric and avoirdupois systems. No, there is
something more here.
It is clear that there is a moral tone to this writing, interspersed among the prices
there are words like “discipline and enterprise.” He does not say he was paid $1 per
hour in the bindery, but that he “labored” for it. Also interspersed among these
prices there is perhaps also a sense that the family was happy with what it got, that
it spent purposefully, buying a suit for a high school graduation, rather than spending
money for frivolous purposes. It would appear that the list of individual prices
presented in association with such moral judgments is an effective literary device
because these individual price changes are tied up with such judgments in people’s
memories.
It is difficult to capture just what those we talked to seemed to be thinking about
morale or morality. The following question was placed on the C questionnaire to try
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to capture some notion of this concern:
C4. Do you agree with the following statement? “ When a country has too high an inflation rate,
society loses its cohesion and feeling for the common good.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
44%
21%
19%
12%
3%
n = 112
born < 1940
62%
16%
13%
7%
2%
n = 45
born 1950–
31%
27%
22%
13%
7%
n = 45
Germany All
36%
13%
32%
12%
7%
n = 168
born < 1940
49%
15%
24%
8%
4%
n = 75
born 1950–
19%
13%
42%
19%
8%
n = 53
Brazil
26%
37%
12%
11%
14%
n = 57

About half of the older Germans and half of the US respondents fully agreed with
this statement, and the overall result from all countries is that very few strongly
disagree.12 The Brazilians are less likely to agree strongly than are the German or the
US respondents. One might suppose that the difference is because they have experienced high inflation and society did not fall apart. But note that the Brazilians
picked 1 about as often as the younger US and Germany respondents together did;
the strong intergenerational differences in answers here are the striking result here,
not the international differences.
In talking to people about the issues raised by the Reader’s Digest article, I also
got the impression, curiously, that people think that differences in prices between
now and long ago are somehow a reflection of a fundamental change in values and
the nature of our society, rather than a reflection of purely economic forces. Tied up
with this opinion, there seemed to be an odd sense that some break with the past
occurred, and that in getting here from there was not a continuous path. Odd as this
impression seemed, I decided to try to follow up on it with a question:

12

In the pilot study for this paper, as part of another questionnaire survey I was
conducting in the spring of 1995, to institutional investment managers, I asked the following
questions about the moral dimension in inflation:
What effect do you think that a strongly and steadily inflationary national policy would have on
the nation’s feeling of morale and sense of shared social purpose?
1. very harmful
2. mildly harmful
3. neutral
4. mildly beneficial
5. very beneficial

Of the 87 respondents to this question, 77.2% chose 1, 19.3% chose 2, none chose 3, 3.4%
chose 4, and none chose 5.
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B14. Do you agree with the following statement? “The fact that prices are nearly three times as
high as they were twenty years ago is due to a fundamental change in the nature of the
economy, not due to the gradual accumulation over the years of the annual inflation, inflation
which has generally been far below ten percent a year.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
21%
21%
23%
21%
15%
n = 110
Economists
5%
1%
0%
12%
82%
n = 77

A substantial minority of the public circled 1 or 2, confirming at least that the
statement sounds right to a lot of people, but the economists did not, and feedback
suggested that the economists were perplexed by the question.
V.7. Political and Economic Chaos Caused by Inflation
Reading the popular literature suggests that there is widespread concern that the
effects of inflation may be so severe as to cause a breakdown in the political and
economic conditions in a country. It is very easy to find quotes supporting this idea;
there are very many. The following 1919 passage from Keynes is so widely cited as
almost to be a cliche:
Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to
debauch the currency. By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate,
secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this
method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process
impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement
of riches strikes not only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing
distribution of wealth. Those to whom the system brings windfalls beyond their deserts
and even beyond their expectations and desires, become ‘profiteers’, who are the object
of hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has impoverished, not less than of
the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates
wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors,
which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be
almost meaningless, and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a
lottery.13

Similar themes can be found more recently:
“Unstable money destroys the public-spirited and social foundation of every free state’s

13

Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) [1979], pp. 147–8.
Subsequent commentary on this passage has raised questions whether Lenin ever said this.
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order” (Ludwig Erhard, 1955). 14
“Without good money, there is no healthy economy and no healthy social conditions”
(Karl Blessing, 1957). 15
“Freedom of the individual, which we all idealize, can only be assured through good
money” (Fritz Butschkau, 1968). 16
“The consequences of the international [inflationary] spiral go far beyond economics:
they include a sharpening of social divisions and a shaking of values, as inflation
rewards speculators while penalizing thrift. The ultimate threat is that inflation will
eventually weaken confidence in democratic governments and institutions and prepare
the way for sharp violent shifts to the radical right or left” (Reader’s Digest [condensed
from Time, p. 50], July 1974, pp. 49–53).

Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor, has quite recently, in the context of the debate
over European Economic and Monetary Union, made the effects of inflation on
democracy an important part of his message to the public (quoted in Cowell, 1995,
p. A10, col. 1):
From bitter historical experience, we know how quickly inflation destroys confidence
in the reliability of political institutions and ends up endangering democracy.

Kohl argued that we should not let the current atmosphere of cooperation in Europe
encourage complacency, and argued against those who say that his concerns are
exaggerated (quoted in Cowell, 1995, p. A10, col. 1):
To anyone who says this is inadmissible histrionics, I ask this question: Who among us
five years ago would have believed that the Balkans would have fallen so rapidly into
fratricidal war, to ethnic hounding, to rape, murder and death?

To try to test whether the public is indeed concerned that inflation can cause
economic and political chaos, the following question was included on the C
questionnaire:

14
Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer, Zitate zur Stabilitätspolitik, Bonn,
December 1990, p. 21 (our translation). Starting as German economics minister in 1948,
Erhard became known as the “father of the German economic miracle.” He was German
Chancellor 1963–6.
15

Loc. Cit. (our translation). Blessing was president of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

16

Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer, Zitate zur Stabilitätspolitik, Bonn,
December 1990, p. 20 (our translation). Butschkau was a German bank president (Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband).
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C3. Do you agree with the following statement? “If inflation in a country rises out of control it
can lead to economic and political chaos.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
74%
17%
3%
2%
3%
n = 123
born < 1940
84%
11%
0%
2%
2%
n = 45
born 1950–
71%
20%
2%
0%
7%
n = 45
Germany All
77%
18%
3%
2%
0%
n = 173
born < 1940
89%
8%
3%
0%
0%
n = 76
born 1950–
69%
27%
2%
2%
0%
n = 55
Brazil
41%
31%
7%
14%
7%
n = 58

There is a lot of agreement with this statement, suggesting that this concern about
inflation is a major one. It is perhaps surprising that there is not much difference between the US and Germany on answers here. When comparing the US and Germany,
the difference is more intergenerational than international. Only the Brazilians did
not fully agree in the majority with this statement, presumably reflecting the fact that
the Brazilians have had a lot of inflation and have not experienced economic and
political chaos. Even so, a majority of Brazilians chose 1 or 2.
To further consolidate our understanding of the public support of the proposition
that inflation causes economic and political chaos, it is useful to confirm whether the
public really thinks that the line of causality runs only from inflation to the chaos, and
not also the other way around:
C12. Do you agree with the following statement? “Political instability in a country will likely have
a very high inflation rate as a consequence.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
26%
30%
34%
5%
5%
n = 122
born < 1940
36%
27%
30%
2%
5%
n = 44
born 1950–
23%
30%
34%
9%
5%
n = 44
Germany All
39%
27%
26%
4%
4%
n = 171
born < 1940
53%
19%
24%
1%
3%
n = 75
born 1950–
20%
47%
25%
4%
4%
n = 55
Brazil
21%
25%
23%
14%
18%
n = 57

The impression that such reverse causality is a factor is less strong, and only about
half of the older Germans are in full agreement. Still, the majority of people in the
US and Germany choose either 1 or 2 here.
V.8. Concerns for Prestige and the Currency
National prestige is presumably an important factor in its own right, and there
appears to be a concern with inflation among the general public, that we must keep
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it low in order to preserve such prestige:
The inflation rate has proven to be the best indicator for the ability of a country, not to
postpone or cover up it problems, but to solve them” (Sachverständigenrat, 1981). 17

Inflation is by definition a depreciation of the currency against the consumer
market basket, it may also be associated, if the inflation is high, with a depreciation
of the currency against other nation’s currencies. The decline in value of the currency seems to raise other emotional issues.
“Nothing is quite so striking a symbol of national prestige as a currency . . .” (Karen
Pennar, “Is the Nation State Obsolete in a Global Economy?” Business Week, July 17,
1995, p. 80).
Another example, from Germany:
“Until today, the history of Germany after the war is a history in which the D-Mark is
of great importance. This is valid for the rise of the German currency from the child of
the occupation to a world star as well as for the German fears that are associated with
the coming European currency. For this Germany, there is much truth in what the great
economist Schumpeter wrote, namely that there is reflected in the monetary situation of
a nation everything that this nation wants, does, suffers, and is, and that at the same time
the currency of a nation has a substantial influence on its economic affairs and on its fate
altogether. . . Before the Federal Republic was founded, before there was a national
flag, the really leading philosophy of life was predetermined by [Ludwig] Erhard’s
economic and monetary reform, by the D-Mark” [Jürgen Jeske, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, July 1, 1995, p. 1 (our translation)].

It is common in Germany to refer to countries whose exchange rate has been
declining as Weichwährungsländer (soft-currency countries). Now, there are
certainly potentially many ways to group or describe countries, one could refer to less
developed countries, or high-population growth countries, or many other categorizations. To an economist, referring to countries in this manner is not natural
unless one is referring to their exchange rates. But, apparently, the word is
commonplace and used in much broader contexts. Thus, in a sense the German
language itself has changed to incorporate certain assumptions about the correlates
of weak exchange rates. To compare with English speaking countries, I did a Nexis
search on the term soft currency country or soft currency countries on CURNEWS
(8/25/95). Only 22 entries were found, and in about 2/3 of these, the stories were
also connected in one way or another to either Germany or Switzerland, suggesting
that the use of this term may have crept in to the English from the German sources.
Thus, the term soft-currency countries does not appear to have the significance in
English that it does in German.
17

Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer, Zitate zur Stabilitätspolitik, Bonn,
December 1990, p. 22 (our translation).
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This concern with prestige was confirmed by results from the C questionnaire:
C13. Do you agree with the following statement? “When a country has too high an inflation rate,
it can lose international prestige.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
46%
36%
10%
5%
3%
n = 121
born < 1940
56%
35%
5%
0%
5%
n = 43
born 1950–
36%
36%
16%
7%
5%
n = 44
Germany All
51%
29%
13%
6%
1%
n = 171
born < 1940
62%
21%
12%
5%
0%
n = 76
born 1950–
36%
42%
15%
7%
0%
n = 55
Brazil
54%
21%
12%
7%
5%
n = 57

There appears to be a strong belief that such prestige loss is at stake with high inflation. Again it is the older respondents from US and Germany who are more likely
to fully agree.18
In writing this question, we were concerned that it could be the case that
international differences in concerns with prestige might have more to do with the
consequences of loss of prestige than in the association of prestige with inflation, and
so the following question was added to the questionnaire immediately after the
above:

18

I asked the institutional investors, as part of the above-mentioned pilot-study
questionnaire:
What effect do you think that a strongly and steadily inflationary national policy would have on
U. S. international prestige?
1. very harmful
2. mildly harmful
3. neutral
4. mildly beneficial
5. very beneficial

Of the 88 responses to this question, 85.2% chose 1, 10.2% chose 2, 1.1% chose 3, 1.1%
chose 4, and 2.3% chose 5.
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C14. Do you agree with the following statement? “Even if a country loses prestige because of high
inflation, it doesn’t matter. There are no really serious consequences to such a loss of
prestige.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
2%
6%
10%
39%
44%
n = 122
born < 1940
5%
7%
9%
23%
57%
n = 44
born 1950–
0%
7%
11%
45%
36%
n = 44
Germany All
8%
12%
21%
21%
37%
n = 74
born < 1940
11%
12%
23%
12%
42%
n = 74
born 1950–
4%
7%
11%
38%
40%
n = 55
Brazil
5%
9%
7%
16%
63%
n = 57

Very few agreed with this statement, and moreover, no large international differences
were found in opinions on the seriousness of loss of prestige: people in all countries
tend to think that maintaining national prestige is important. Contrary to
expectations, it was the Germans who appeared most likely to agree (choose 1 or 2).
This line of questioning was then rephrased to be in terms of the value of the
currency rather than the inflation rate:
C17. Do you agree with the following statement? “It is too bad, when the exchange rate of the dollar
[D-Mark, Real], the value of the dollar [D-Mark, Real] in comparison with currencies of other
countries, falls. Therefore, an important symbol of our economic strength is weakened.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
50%
23%
15%
6%
6%
n = 122
born < 1940
59%
23%
14%
2%
2%
n = 44
born 1950–
41%
27%
11%
11%
9%
n = 44
Germany All
47%
18%
16%
13%
6%
n = 173
born < 1940
52%
16%
18%
8%
6%
n = 77
born 1950–
40%
22%
15%
18%
5%
n = 55
Brazil
12%
25%
16%
16%
32%
n = 57

About half the people in all countries but Brazil are in full agreement with this
statement. Presumably Brazilians, who have seen their currency fall so much, and
seeing a recent renaming of their currency, have lost such hopes for prestige of their
currency.
V.9. Opinions about Simple Theories of Inflation and Its Consequences
Opinions about the costs of inflation may differ among groups due to differences of
opinion about some very simple economic relations that usually are not discussed.
I first tried to see whether the public agrees with conventional economic reasoning
as regards the effects of inflation on the exchange rate and on inflation rates, and to
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compare their answers with those of economists:
B15. If the price level goes up a lot more in the United States than it does in other countries, then
the dollar will tend to: [Circle one number]
1. Go up in value abroad (foreigners will have to pay more of their money if they want to
exchange their money for a dollar)
2. Stay the same
3. Go down in value abroad (foreigners will have to pay less of their money if they want to
exchange their money for a dollar)
4. No opinion
1
2
3
4
US All
30%
5%
55%
9%
n = 110
Economists
4%
0%
92%
4%
n = 78
B16. If the inflation rate goes up, then interest rates will tend to: [Circle one number]
1. Go up
2. Stay the same
3. Go down
4. No opinion
1
2
3
4
US All
72%
4%
21%
3%
n = 112
Economists
97%
1%
0%
1%
n = 79

It appears here that the public and economists are in general agreement on both of
these basic theoretical models. The public usually answers correctly (to question
B15) about the effects of inflation on the exchange rate, though their answers to this
question are wrong about a third of the time. Perhaps more people would have
answered correctly if the question had explained the situation a little more or if the
question were put in the context of a particular situation. The public does even better
on the effects of inflation on interest rates, answering correctly (to question B16)
nearly three quarters of the time. This theory is very important in judging the impact
of inflation on our standard of living, since it is consistent with the view that people
living off their savings invested in short-term debt are not necessarily harmed by
inflation. (Question C11B on page 38 below will draw out whether the public is
aware of this line of this reasoning.)
It is not clear from the public’s partial success in answering what are the effects
of inflation on the exchange rate whether they can carry this line of reasoning much
further. It is plausible that they would be influenced by a theory that price inflation
in our own country harms our competitiveness abroad, and indeed we heard such
theories in our conversations before writing the questionnaire. A question that tried
to see how often such a theory about inflation and competitiveness is held was
included on the C questionnaire:
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C16. Do you agree with the following statement? “One reason the US [Germany, Brazil] loses from
inflation is that the goods that we sell abroad get ever more expensive, therefore our exports
fall and jobs get lost.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
42%
30%
15%
7%
6%
n = 122
born < 1940
48%
27%
16%
5%
5%
n = 44
born 1950–
30%
34%
16%
9%
11%
n = 44
Germany All
58%
16%
13%
5%
8%
n = 169
born < 1940
68%
12%
11%
3%
7%
n = 76
born 1950–
40%
25%
21%
8%
8%
n = 53
Brazil
5%
15%
16%
9%
55%
n = 55

Now, it is apparent the theory does indeed have some sway over people’s thinking,
at least outside of Brazil. This is an important result, indicating that even though
most people are aware of the effect of inflation on the exchange rates, they do not put
this awareness together with a theory about international competitiveness, and are
likely to want to oppose inflation for a reason that most economists would probably
consider very strange. Of course, the public in Germany may be thinking about
exchange rate restrictions within the European Economic and Monetary Union, and
all respondents may be thinking about some very short run effects on exchange rates
that might be resisted by central banks. That Brazilian respondents were relatively
more successful in giving what I consider the correct answer, and this could be due
either to the fact that Brazil has experienced such enormous price level movements
that people must have learned that the exchange rate adjusts, or to the bias of our email sample in Brazil towards more sophisticated people.
Another popular theory about the behavior of inflation that could well have an
important role in public thinking about, and concerns about, inflation news is a sort
of foot-in-the-door theory: if inflation ever gets started, ever gets its foot in the door,
then there is a risk of explosive inflation. Such a theory is described in popular
accounts; for example:
“With inflation, one can make no easy compromise — if one extends her a finger, she
quickly grabs the whole hand (and if one flirts with her, one will end up married to her)”
(Otmar Emminger, 1979). 19

Belief in such a theory would create a reason for extreme vigilance regarding
inflation, and so I included a question about it:

19

Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer, Zitate zur Stabilitätspolitik, Bonn,
December 1990, p. 21 (our translation).
35

C2. Do you agree with the following statement? “If the inflation rate is ever allowed to get above
some threshold, it can happen that it gets out of control and prices rise faster and faster.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
53%
31%
9%
5%
2%
n = 124
born < 1940
58%
33%
4%
2%
2%
n = 45
born 1950–
44%
24%
20%
7%
4%
n = 45
Germany All
69%
18%
9%
1%
3%
n = 171
born < 1940
77%
16%
7%
0%
0%
n = 74
born 1950–
56%
21%
15%
2%
5%
n = 55
Brazil
49%
33%
4%
9%
5%
n = 57

This foot-in-the-door theory is popular in all countries. Germans, especially the older
Germans, are more likely to agree fully with the statement.
In talking with our subjects before writing the questionnaires, another view was
noted that seems very strange to economists, but was held with some conviction:
people seemed to be saying that there is a potential for a serious problem with inflation, even if it is steady, because eventually the currency will become worthless. It
seemed that they were thinking that the exponential decay function y = e –x actually
hits the x axis at some point, rather than being asymptotic to it, or as if they did not
understand that the units of measurement, the number of zeros that we put on prices,
really do not have any significance. I tried to capture this view in a question, to
present both to the general public and to economists:
B19. Do you agree with the following statement? “We can live with moderate, steady inflation for
a while, but sooner or later there has to be an alarming problem with steady inflation: if the
inflation continues long enough then eventually the dollar will be practically worthless.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
44%
20%
15%
14%
7%
n = 110
Economists
0%
3%
10%
16%
71%
n = 73

None of the economists agreed fully with this bizarre statement, which provoked
annoyed comments from some of them on the questionnaire, but nearly half of the
public did.20
I sought to find, finally, some sense that there are different impressions as to the
20

Perhaps the question is not worded clearly enough to reveal the misconception that I
though was at work in people’s thinking, but I felt that if the statement were made with mathematical precision then people would not react to it with their accustomed patterns of
thought, and might accept it as a logical challenge instead. It is in practice difficult to document the nature of common mental confusions, and this question is only a weak attempt at
doing so.
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validity of the Phillips curve over wide ranges of inflation rates, thinking that in
Brazil, at least, the higher inflation might be associated with a view that there are
benefits to such inflation:
C7. A number of countries have had inflation rates over 10% a month (that means approximately a
tripling of prices in a year). Do you agree with the following statement? “One can say that these
countries in a certain sense have been lucky despite the inflation, because with the high inflation
there were probably also more jobs.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
2%
0%
14%
25%
60%
n = 124
born < 1940
4%
0%
18%
11%
67%
n = 45
born 1950–
0%
0%
13%
31%
56%
n = 45
Germany All
1%
6%
27%
11%
54%
n = 171
born < 1940
3%
5%
32%
15%
45%
n = 74
born 1950–
0%
2%
20%
2%
76%
n = 55
Brazil
0%
2%
16%
19%
63%
n = 57

The answers to this question did not come as I had expected. It was in fact the older
Germans, not the Brazilians, who least disagreed.

VI. Causes of Differing Public Attitudes Towards Inflation
VI.1. Differing Public Information Sets
An impression how and why opinions differ across countries or across groups can be
produced by our exploring what information people have in the various countries,
and the differences across countries in terms of information sets. For example, the
anti-inflation bias in Germany is thought by many to be a result of people there
remembering the hyperinflation in the 1920s, or remembering the high inflation
immediately following World War II. People in other countries, if they do not know
of such events, are not likely to reach the same opinions about what may happen in
the future. For other examples, differences in opinions about inflation may come
about because of different prominence in people’s memories of such facts as the
effects of inflation on debts. We attempted to find out what people hear about concerning inflation by running the following battery of questions in the C questionnaire:
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The following are questions for which you should indicate how often you have heard the statement
approximately. This is not a question about whether the statement is true or false, but only how
familiar such a statement seems to you.
C11A. “An important reason for Hitler’s rise to power was the extremely high inflation in Germany
in the 1920s.”
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
22%
33%
45%
n = 121
born < 1940
25%
34%
41%
n = 44
born 1950–
16%
28%
56%
n = 43
Germany All
44%
41%
15%
n = 170
born < 1940
50%
36%
14%
n = 74
born 1950–
39%
44%
17%
n = 54
Brazil
34%
45%
21%
n = 56
C11B. “High inflation is unfair for many people since their savings lose value because the interest
rates are not really high enough to compensate for the inflation.”
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
51%
36%
13%
n = 122
born < 1940
57%
36%
7%
n = 44
born 1950–
41%
34%
25%
n = 44
Germany All
62%
28%
9%
n = 169
born < 1940
66%
26%
8%
n = 74
born 1950–
52%
35%
13%
n = 54
Brazil
45%
39%
16%
n = 56
C11C. “People who are in debt, for example when they buy a house, have an advantage when the
inflation rate increases, because the real value of their debt falls.”
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
21%
43%
35%
n = 122
born < 1940
23%
48%
30%
n = 44
born 1950–
18%
45%
36%
n = 44
Germany All
33%
40%
28%
n = 169
born < 1940
38%
38%
23%
n = 73
born 1950–
20%
43%
37%
n = 54
Brazil
26%
37%
37%
n = 54
C11D. “Working people often find it hard to make ends meet because of inflation.”
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
70%
26%
4%
n = 122
born < 1940
75%
20%
5%
n = 44
born 1950–
61%
32%
7%
n = 44
Germany All
49%
36%
15%
n = 168
born < 1940
58%
34%
8%
n = 74
born 1950–
37%
39%
24%
n = 54
Brazil
91%
9%
0%
n = 56
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C11E. “Retired people can’t afford to buy so much because of inflation, because their pensions do
not keep up with inflation.”
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
83%
15%
2%
n = 122
born < 1940
93%
5%
2%
n = 44
born 1950–
66%
30%
5%
n = 44
Germany All
58%
27%
15%
n = 169
born < 1940
71%
19%
11%
n = 75
born 1950–
39%
37%
24%
n = 54
Brazil
89%
9%
2%
n = 56
C11F. Remarkable stories about life in times of very high inflation are told. For example, people
are said to have tried to spend their money as fast as possible, and stores are said to have
raised prices extremely often.
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
22%
33%
45%
n = 121
born < 1940
34%
32%
34%
n = 44
born 1950–
11%
34%
55%
n = 44
Germany All
44%
28%
28%
n = 172
born < 1940
40%
36%
23%
n = 77
born 1950–
39%
24%
37%
n = 54
Brazil
75%
21%
4%
n = 56
C11G. “Chile has had lower inflation in the last decade than Argentina has.”
I have heard this:
1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
US All
0%
11%
89%
n = 119
born < 1940
0%
18%
82%
n = 45
born 1950–
0%
5%
95%
n = 43
Germany All
2%
12%
86%
n = 164
born < 1940
4%
18%
78%
n = 72
born 1950–
0%
4%
96%
n = 53
Brazil
22%
33%
44%
n = 54

Reading these responses, one is led to suspect that people interpreted very loosely
what it means to hear these statements, the frequencies reporting hearing some
statements seem high for the general population. Still, comparing answers in this
battery of questions across countries and age groups, we learn various things. Overall, the statements people reported hearing most often are those about the difficulty
of living with inflation, C11B, C11D and C11E.
Comparing C11B with C11C, we see that people in all countries apparently hear
more about effects negative effects on creditors than about positive effects on
debtors, although most people in all countries claim to have heard at least sometimes
that debtors can be made better off by inflation. This result confirms the impression
from our personal interviews, and from the responses to open-ended questions on
questionnaire A, that the awareness of potential advantages of inflation to debtors are
just not so strongly recognized.
Results for C11A and C11F show that there are important international differences in hearing about some famous hyperinflation episodes. The statement C11G
was included just to give a suggestion to what extent news about inflation is
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transmitted regionally, to what extent people hear more about countries that are near
neighbors rather than distant neighbors: Chile has had dramatically less inflation in
the last decade than Argentina has; it has escaped the hyperinflation experience of
Argentina. If people in Latin American countries tend to hear about the inflation
experience of other Latin American countries rather than that of European countries,
then this would tend to create some tendency for similar opinions across Latin
American countries, and hence perhaps similar inflation experience, why high
inflation has been so commonplace there. This hypothesis appears to be borne out;
55% of the Brazilian respondents reported hearing this fact about Chile and
Argentina at least sometimes, compared with only 11% of the US respondents and
14% of the Germans. (Unfortunately, this result might be compromised by selection
bias, as e-mail respondents may be more knowledgeable.)
Most people in all countries and age groups, except for the younger US
respondents, say they have heard at least sometimes that high inflation was an
important reason for Hitler’s rise to power. It seems a little surprising to me that so
many people report hearing this. Perhaps people are thinking back on vague
recollections about some chaos in the Weimar Republic leading to Hitler’s power,
and thinking that it is plausible that inflation played some role in it.
Economic commentators often attach credence to the notion that living through
the German hyperinflation in 1923, or having closely associated with people who did,
accounts for the national aversion to inflation in Germany today, and that therefore
older people in Germany are more conservative regarding inflation. If this is the
case, then one might expect that Germans will gradually forget their aversion to
inflation, and return to more normal inflation behavior in the future.
Why should living through the inflation of 1923, or remembering talking to
people who did, make such an impression? Brazilians today have lived through
hyperinflation, but we have seen above that they are less worried about the
consequences of inflation. The answer may lie in that there are differences in the
Brazilian experience, and differences in what people remember. The critical differences are that in Germany in 1923 the inflation got further out of control than did the
more recent Brazilian inflations, and that the loss of control in Germany then coincided with real political chaos, and with Hitler’s initial efforts to control Germany.
A fact that is probably little known to young people today, even in Germany, is
that the final collapse of the Mark in 1923, the time when the Mark’s inflation
reached astronomical levels (inflation of 35,874.9% in November 1923 alone, for an
annual rate that month of 4.69 × 1028%), came in the same month as did Hitler’s Beer
Hall Putsch, his Nazi Party’s armed attempt to overthrow the German government.21
This failed putsch resulted in Hitler’s imprisonment, at which time he wrote his book
Mein Kampf, setting forth an inspirational plan for Germany’s future, suggesting
21

German wholesale price data, from the Statistisches Reichsamt, see Cagan (1956), p.
102–3.
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plans for world domination. Another coincidence that probably few remember today:
the Kapp Putsch, which resulted in Berlin’s temporary capture in March 1919 by the
Freikorps, occurred immediately after a sudden, temporary, burst of inflation: prices
rose 34.2% in February 1919 (annual rate of 3,297.8%), and 56.4% in January 1919
(annual rate of 21,358.5%) though prices increased only 1.4% in March itself. 22
Most people in Germany today probably do not clearly remember these events;
this lack of attention to it may be because its memory is blurred by the more dramatic
events that succeeded it (the Nazi seizure of power and World War II). However, to
someone living through these historical events in sequence, to whom the association
of the 1923 putsch and the Kapp Putsch with the hyperinflation would be obvious,
these putsches may have been remembered as vivid evidence of the potential effects
of inflation. Our single question, C11A, about the inflation of the 20s does not
confirm a huge intergenerational difference in Germany in terms of information about
hyperinflation. Perhaps what persists is a memory that older Germans shared a
strong conviction produced by experience that inflation may breed political chaos,
even though their reasons for believing this are now largely forgotten.
What tends to be remembered from generation to generation may be a combination of stories of vivid events and impressions of conventional wisdom, and not
complicated arguments for inferring causality. Stories about vivid events are much
easier to remember and natural to transmit to others.
We find indeed that hearing such vivid stories (question C11F) about life in
times of high inflation is reported most often by Brazilians, not surprising since their
hyperinflation is so recent, and, less obviously, more often by Germans than the US
respondents. We are a little surprised that the older Germans do not report hearing
such stories significantly more often than did the younger Germans, suggesting that
perhaps such stories, to the extent that they are still told, are part of a national culture
in Germany, that circulates through all age groups.
VI.2 Influence of Media and Professionals
An important transmitter of public attitudes towards inflation is found in society and
the media. The real reasons for public concern with inflation may have largely to do
with how opinion leaders treat the issue. Columnists, politicians, and other public
figures have learned that the word “inflation” is already loaded with associations and
22

The communist Spartacist Revolt in Berlin in January 1919 also came at a time of high
inflation, 6.9% in January 1919 (annual rate of 134.6%), a rate which must have appeared
high by comparison with inflation rates in Germany during World War I. There are of course
other times when high inflation corresponded to revolutions. For example, there was in Chile
a dramatic increase in inflation in 1973 (to over fourfold price increase in the year) when
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte overthrew of the Marxist government of Salvador Allende
Gossens, leading to over 15 years of military government.
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assumptions, and by trying to exploit these associations and assumptions to make
their own words have more effect, they may serve to reinforce them. According to
the German economist Günter Schmölders (1969, p. 202, our translation):
In the case of a developed, high inflation, one will have to consider the phenomenon of
social infection, beyond mere individual motivations. This is because inflations are in
the first place social processes. The individual reactions of economic agents will be
guided by group interactions because people watch each other in their behavior and to
a certain extent control each other. In this context we have that the behavior of the press
is of particular importance because it is a sociological group that reacts to crises and the
associated events in a pointed manner and that can propagate its opinions effectively
through the appropriate media. A part of the atmosphere of the crisis of 1966/7 has
probably not just economic but also political and journalistic origins. Frequently, the
way events are reported creates an artificial reality, that becomes real through socialpsychological feedback processes. This is a phenomenon that is made very clear by the
Anglo-Saxon expression “self-fulfilling prophecy.”

As with any phenomenon that is widely discussed publicly, inflation is likely to
be associated with the sort of herd effects described by Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer
and Welch (1992) or Banerjee (1992). People have learned through life’s experiences to imitate others when in doubt, particularly those who are perceived as
experts, since other people’s actions may well be based on some information. The
problem with such behavior is that information cascades can get started: people may
be imitating others who are in turn imitating others who are imitating others. The
overall results of such information cascades may be a sense of public opinion, of
received wisdom, that may in fact have little basis.
The fact that so many of the differences we see in answers to our question are
intergenerational rather than international suggests that the influence of the media is
very large. There appears to be a culture of opinions about inflation that is shared by
people in the same generation in both the US and Germany, and yet one must doubt
that there has been much direct interpersonal communication between people in the
US and people in Germany. The communications are probably mostly managed by
the communications media. Because these media have been so important in reporting
current events, older people in the US today may be influenced by events in Germany
before 1950 more than are younger Germans; this is supported by the results from
question C11F, though not from C11A.
Those who manage the mass communications media must be aware of the
abiding public interest in inflation, and at the same time they are, in writing the usual
news stories about current events, probably not themselves interested in obtaining a
deep understanding of the phenomenon. The incentives these people are under,
therefore, is to give publicity to those economists who repeat conventional wisdom
regarding it; since media people are often pretty well aware of opinion expressed in
news media in other countries, they may tend to promote a world as well as a national
culture regarding inflation. The outcome of this media process is the result that the
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general public seems to have the impression that the experts are confirming their
impressions as to the importance of inflation.
In this connection, it is very significant that the results with the B questionnaire
show that much of the public thinks that the media attention given to inflation is at
the urging of economists, a far higher proportion than of economists who themselves
think so:
B8. Which is the better explanation why inflation is reported so regularly in the news:
1. Economists tell reporters that the monthly inflation numbers are very important news, and
so reporters feel that they ought to give the inflation numbers a lot of coverage.
2. The general public is regularly interested in inflation news, and reporters cover inflation
to boost the number of viewers or readers.
3. Neither or no opinion.
1
2
3
US All
39%
30%
31%
n = 110
Economists
18%
56%
26%
n = 77

About twice as many from the public chose one; it appears that the public imagines
that expert opinion shapes media attention to inflation more than the economists
themselves think it does.
VI.3. Perceptions of the Social Contract
It appears likely that there is to some extent a public perception of a sort of social
contract that governments must resist inflation, a contract that we are all born into,
and that we as individuals cannot change, any more than we can change the constitution. To the extent that there is such a public perception, anyone who takes public
office must feel that he or she is in a position of public trust, and is under pressure
to live up to public expectations. Those in public offices may choose political
battles, on issues that matter a lot to them, and they may try to fight popular misconceptions, but are not generally likely to have the time or energy to fight the public
impressions on such long-debated background issues as basic policy towards inflation. I sought to determine whether there is any agreement that such a social contract
exists:
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C15. Do you agree with the following statement? “Despite some opinion differences, US [German,
Brazilian] politicians have always promised to keep inflation down. Especially for this reason,
politicians today are morally obligated to be against inflation.”
1
2
3
4
5
Fully agree
Undecided
Completely
disagree
US All
27%
26%
17%
19%
12%
n = 121
born < 1940
48%
14%
16%
11%
11%
n = 44
born 1950–
14%
35%
12%
28%
12%
n = 43
Germany All
65%
19%
10%
4%
2%
n = 171
born < 1940
82%
9%
8%
1%
0%
n = 76
born 1950–
41%
28%
15%
9%
7%
n = 54
Brazil
34%
16%
23%
9%
18%
n = 56

Here we see some striking differences between Germany and the other countries, that
would work in the direction of preserving low inflation policy there even if there
were no differences in understandings of the mechanism of inflation. It is in this
question that see the biggest difference, from all our questionnaire results, between
the German and US respondents overall in the proportion who fully agree. We also
see here sharpest difference between younger German and the US respondents; 41%
of the younger Germans fully agree, compared with only 14% of the younger US
respondents.
The results with this question suggest that it may be in perceptions of the social
contract that there are the most important differences between Germans and people
in other countries, rather than differences in tastes, opinions, or information sets.
Because the differences extend to the younger generation, these are also significant
in that they would appear likely to be important for a long time. More research
should be done to consolidate our understanding of the international differences in
social contract.

VII. Summary and Interpretation of the Results
To summarize the main perceived costs of inflation briefly, the concerns people
mention first regarding inflation are that it hurts their standard of living, and a
popular model they have that makes such an effect plausible apparently has some
badly-behaving or greedy people causing prices to increase, increases that are not met
with wage increases. This might be called a bad-actor-sticky-wage model. That
people think wages are sticky is particularly supported by the results for questions C5
(page 20), C6 (page 20), B6 (page 19) and B12 (page 19). There also appear to be
popular notions that inflation harms the standard of living by inhibiting economic
growth, through some unspecified systemic factors (question C11, page 17). Other
concerns are that inflation makes us feel good (question B17, page 24), but ultimately
deceives us, or allows opportunistic people to deceive us (question B10, page 26),
that the social atmosphere created by inflation is a selfish one and harmful to national
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morale (question C4, page 27), that high inflation can cause political chaos or
anarchy (question C3, page 30), and that inflation and decline of currency value is
harmful to national prestige (questions C13, page 32, and C17, page 34).
The list of concerns that non-economists aired to us, in conversation, in their
answers to the open-ended questionnaire A, and in their choice of answers on the
other questionnaires, sound very different from the list of real effects of inflation that
Fischer and Modigliani gave in their treatise (1978) on the costs of inflation. Fischer
and Modigliani divided the costs of inflation into six categories: 1) those that would
persist even in a fully indexed economy, 2) those due to nominal government
institutions, 3) those due to nominal private institutions and habits, 4) those due to
existing nominal contracts, 5) those due to effects of uncertainty about future
inflation, and 6) those due to government endeavors to suppress inflation. The
effects listed under category one are the “shoe-leather” or “trips to the bank” costs
produced when people try to economize on currency and the “menu costs,” the cost
of changing prices, such as printing new menus. Question B9 (page 16) asked about
these costs, the inconveniences of inflation, versus the effects of inflation on the
standard of living, both of economists and the general public, and there was a striking
difference in the answers; the public was much more fixated on the supposed direct
effects of inflation on the standard of living, and relatively indifferent to the
inconveniences of inflation. In non-economists answers to the open-ended questionnaire, questionnaire A, there were hardly any references (only four people) to the
effects of the nominal institutions, habits or contracts referred to by Fischer and
Modigliani under their causes 2 through 4, nor was there any mention of the effects
of uncertainty about future inflation or about effects of governments’ efforts to
suppress inflation.
The different sound of the complaints does not necessarily mean, however, that
the concerns expressed by the general public are entirely orthogonal to those of
economists. Some of the public’s concerns are surely caused by their experience
with nominal contracts. Some (seven people) did mention at their own initiative on
the A questionnaire that their retirement income was being eroded by inflation, and
moreover, most were aware that this was an effect when asked directly about it
(question C11E, page 39). The vast numbers of nominal contracts that we have today
were made in a sense of trust that the government would not allow massive inflation,
and these concerns are shared by economists and the public.
The issues of inflation-generated opportunities for deception (question B10, page
26), and the effects of inflation on national cohesion and international prestige
(questions C4, page 27 and C13, page 32) are curious for economists, and do not
appear on the Fischer–Modigliani list. Perhaps it is here that we should listen
carefully to what the public is telling us. A feeling that opportunities for profit
through deception are being willingly created by an inflationary policy, possibly to
the benefit of certain interest groups, might well promote a feeling of relative
detachment from society and a tendency for less concern for others, especially since
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inflation is a real concern and object of interest among most people. Moreover, we
should also listen to concerns about national prestige, given the attachment in modern
culture of prestige to countries with low inflation and strong exchange rates.
People’s concern for their national prestige is tied up with their feelings of self
esteem, and their trust in their national institutions.
In answering questions about what is really important, and what our national
leaders really ought to pay attention to, people may tend to rely on some deep
intuition derived from life’s experiences. The word intuition may be wrong here;
perhaps what I mean with regard to inflation is that they have dim memories of
having concluded that highly inflationary times were times when there was arbitrary
injustice, arbitrary redistributions, and social bitterness, and they have memories of
social situations in which morale and a sense of cooperation was lost.
Those who implement national policy towards inflation have to sort out which
concerns they share with the public, and which they do not. They need not share all
of these concerns, however, to share a conviction that inflation is to be avoided.
There will probably always be a sort of communication gap between economists and
the public, at least because professional economists devote their time to studying
economic phenomena such as inflation, and earn their keep by being ahead of the
public in knowledge and theories about economic phenomena. But there appears to
be rather more of a gap than most of us would have expected. The public’s models
of the economy are fundamentally different from those of economists (recall for
example questions B12, page 19, B14, page 28, and B19, page 37). The
communications gap is all the wider because many people think that the prominence
given inflation in the news is due to the economists, while economists often feel
differently (question B8, page 43).
The German respondents are, as hypothesized, rather different from the US
respondents in a number of attitudes towards inflation. The Germans tend more often
to believe that there is a sort of social contract that authorities must resist inflation
(question C15, page 44), and the German respondents are more often concerned that
their policy makers deal with inflation (question C1, page 13). Moreover, there are
also important differences between German and US respondents in terms of their
reported information sets (questions C11A through C11D, pages 38–39). All of
these differences extended to the younger German and US respondents as well as the
older. The Germans seem to show a greater tendency to believe models that imply
a high cost to inflation (recall, particularly, questions C2, page 36, and C11, page
17). In most of our other questions, though, there were not great differences between
German and US respondents, and the differences were often very small when
comparisons were made between younger people in Germany and the US. For
example, Germans do not make notably different decisions than do the US
respondents when asked to choose between high inflation and high unemployment
(recall question C8, page 14).
The study also appears to confirm (subject to considerations of the weaknesses
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of the e-mail sampling method used in Brazil) the hypothesis that the Brazilians have
somewhat different opinions about inflation than either German or US respondents.
This difference appears to work in the direction of making it more likely that
politicians or monetary authorities might find it more in their political interest to be
tolerant of inflation there. If one seeks to explain why inflation is persistently higher
in Brazil than in Germany, one might say that the Brazilians are less likely to think
that inflation will cause economic and political chaos (question C3, page 30), are less
likely to think that inflation will be harmful to economic growth (question C11, page
17), less likely to think that inflation will harm their international competitiveness
(C16, page 35), less likely to think that a decline in the exchange rate harms their
international prestige (C17, page 34), and more likely to choose high inflation if that
will reduce unemployment (C8, page 14). Despite these differences, it is also
striking that the Brazilians often did not answer much differently from the young
people either in the US or Germany.
What should we make of the similarity internationally on answers to many
questions? In part, the similarity probably reflects the pervasiveness of a sort of
world culture; opinion leaders in each country read what people in other countries are
saying, and convey the ideas to people in their own countries. On the other hand, the
survey results may in many cases underestimate the extent of international
differences. The differences reported here may not be very small when compared
with differences commonly observed in questionnaire surveys of attitudes on national
issues; there seems often to be substantial noise to answers on difficult questions (see
Converse, 1970, for example), which may dilute actual differences in attitudes in the
survey results. Possibly, the international differences would have been bigger if the
survey had been directed at opinion leaders or knowledgeable people, rather than a
random sample.
This study confirms that the high concern with inflation in both Germany and the
US is in large measure a phenomenon confined to older people, to people born before
1940. A striking finding of this study is that intergenerational differences are usually
of more importance than international differences (on questions that are not about
information, that is, excluding questions C11A through C11G, and looking only at
the US and Germany, where we have intergenerational results). Within Germany and
the US the differences between the younger and older people on attitudes to inflation
tend to be bigger than the differences between the two countries overall.
Since the results reported in this paper were all collected at the same point of
time, Fall 1995, there is no way to discern whether the intergenerational differences
are due to the age of the respondent (perhaps all people get more concerned with
inflation as they age) or, alternatively, to the birth cohort of the respondent (perhaps
living through events of the first part of this century inspires more concern with
inflation). My interpretation is that the intergenerational differences are mostly due
mostly to the latter, the birth cohort differences. It would seem that opinions about
the mechanism and costs of inflation, or the social contract regarding inflation, are
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complex phenomena that must have been formed by shared experiences within birth
cohorts, and are not due to the aging process itself. That opinions about economic
matters are mostly cohort-specific rather than age-specific is supported by the work
of Inglehart (1985), who concludes that one’s basic values throughout life reflect the
conditions that prevailed in one’s preadult years. Inglehart has collected data on
economic opinions, including opinions on inflation, for over twenty years; see also
Inglehart and Abramson (1994).
If the relatively low level of concern of younger people can be expected to
remain the same through time, then the public concern with inflation in both
Germany and the US might be expected to decline in coming decades for
demographic reasons. The people in our sample born before 1940 are now at least
56 years old; those of them in public life are probably at the peak of their influence
or of declining influence. Their ability to prevent a resurgence of inflation must be
waning. People who must evaluate the long-term outlook for inflation (such as those
investing in long-term bonds) should bear this in mind, before concluding (as many
seem to have concluded) that we are entering a new regime of steady low inflation
in coming decades.
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Appendix
Sample Design
For the US, we purchased three lists of 400 names and addresses from Survey
Sampling, Inc., Fairfield, CT, a company that specializes in producing high quality
random samples. Each of the three lists was drawn at random from the white pages
of all phone books in the US. Such a sampling method oversamples males, since
married couples usually list only the husband’s name. However, a letter
accompanying the questionnaires invites the recipient to pass the questionnaire to
someone else, and this should tend to offset the tendency to oversample males. We
ask respondents to indicate their sex; see Table A1.
For Germany, we purchased our list of names from the firm Schober GmbH in
Stuttgart, a firm that specializes in producing random samples. We used a method
of defining the sample that appeared to us as closely comparable as possible to that
which we used in the US. Schober had their names categorized by sex and predicted
income levels. We had them select approximately 120 females and 280 males from
each of their three predicted income groups, low, middle and high, distributed
according to the proportions they have in their lists in each of these three income
groups, from the Land North Rhine Westphalia. Within each of these six income-sex
groups, they chose a random sample from listed names in telephone directories. We
chose fewer females than males because fewer female names are listed in telephone
directories, and those that are listed may be unrepresentative of all females, tending
to be single or elderly women. As in the US surveys, the second letter accompanying
the questionnaire invites anyone in the household to fill out the questionnaire, and
so we might expect to see more females answering than our sample proportions
would indicate. We chose North Rhine Westphalia as representative of Germany; it
is the most populous Land in Germany and includes a mixture of both major urban
and rural areas. It includes the cities of Bonn, Düsseldorf, Münster, and Cologne.
For Brazil, we e-mailed our questionnaire (C), translated into Portuguese to the
Brazil node of Bras-net, a network for Brazilian nationals. Bras-net, a free service
managed by Sao Paulo State University, has about 5000 subscribers who use the
service to receive information (such as a daily survey of Brazilian newspapers), and
to chat with each other about Brazilian topics. Many of the subscribers live outside
Brazil. By e-mailing only to the Brazil node, we hoped to get mainly people living
in Brazil, though certainly many who had their e-mail forwarded from Brazil also
received our questionnaire. Certainly, those who use e-mail are not a random sample
of Brazilians; this sampling technique was undertaken for reason of budget and time
constraint, given that the only alternative was to omit Brazil from the study
altogether. The letter accompanying the questionnaire was different from those sent
in the US and Germany, based on our sense that a request for help via e-mail should
49

be different to succeed well. The letter was less formal, less like the dignified letter
that would accompany a professional survey, evoking instead the camaraderie of
network users. This letter also referred directly to the fact that international
comparisons were being made, while the letter accompanying the US and German
questionnaires suggested this only by mention of both Yale University and the
Institut für Weltwirtschaft. It was felt that, with a questionnaire e-mailed from the
US to Brazil, it would be better if we told them what we were after, to be sure that
they didn’t have the misconception that we wanted them to try to give American
answers.
For economists, 200 copies of questionnaire (B) were distributed by stuffing
faculty mailboxes in US economics departments at Boston University, Columbia
University, Northwestern University, Harvard University, Princeton University,
University of California at Berkeley, and Yale University. Again the accompanying
letter to economists was different from the others. The letter explained this project,
that questions were intended to capture the thoughts of non-economists, and
apologized that some questions might appear ill-posed or unusual to professional
economists.

Survey Method
Our method of handling the survey for random samples of the population in the US
and Germany followed fairly closely that recommended by Dillman (1978). An
initial mailing was made to about 400 people for each questionnaire-country. 23
Included with the questionnaire was a short letter, indicating that inflation was an
important public policy issue, and telling respondents that their cooperation in the
survey would help policy makers frame national policy. We might have preferred not
to put the idea in their heads that inflation is an important national policy issue, but
we felt it was necessary to refer to this in order to get a good response on our survey.
Those who conduct surveys have found that a good response rate on a survey
depends on an apparent social purpose for the questionnaire, and most people are
very skeptical of questionnaires and inclined to suspect a concealed profit motive for
the questionnaire. We tried to write the letter in such a way that there was no
suggestion just why the inflation rate should be an important national policy issue.
A week after the questionnaire and letter were mailed, a reminder postcard was sent
out to all, reminding them of the importance of the study.
On the back page of each questionnaire we had written a number indicating the

23

In fact 382 letters were sent out in the first mailing. When an error was discovered in
the address list they gave us, oversampling by 55 low-income females, we were given a new
sample of 55 respondents, and letters were sent to these; no second mailing went to the 55
low-income females.
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respondent, and so we were able to compile a list of people who had responded.
Three weeks after the first mailing, a second letter, similar to the first, was mailed to
those who had not yet responded, accompanied by a replacement questionnaire, in
case they had lost the first.
In the US, 8% of the 1200 letters sent out in the first mailing were returned for
insufficient or incorrect address, or deceased. Since we received usable 362
responses (see Table A1), this works out to be a response rate from the good
addresses of about a third. The response rate in Germany was somewhat higher: of
the 437 letters mailed, we received usable responses from 176, or 40%, and the actual
response rate must be somewhat higher if it were figured from the base of correct
addresses. (We are lacking a count of the letters returned in Germany for insufficient
or incorrect address or deceased.)
The methods used for Brazil and for economists were more simple. For
economists, the questionnaire and letter were sent only once, by asking colleagues
in the eight universities to stuff mailboxes of professors at the economics
departments. Each department was sent 25 questionnaires, with the request that these
be distributed to professors first and, if there are not enough professors in residence,
the remainder to advanced graduate students. Presumably, there was little
involvement of graduate students in the survey, since most of these departments have
close to 25 professors or more. The response rate from economists was 40%. For
Brazil, an e-mail message was sent three times, with a letter in the second and third
times telling how many responses were received to date and appealing for more
responses to make the sample more informative. The responses amount to about 1%
of the subscribers to Bras-net, however, this figure should not be interpreted as a
response rate, since we have no information how many of the subscribers were
logged on or read the e-mail message.
Table A1
No.
Usable
Questionnaire mailed responses
B US All
400
120
B US All
400
118
B Economists
200
80
C US All
400
124
C Germany
437
176
C Brazil
–
59

Decade of birth 19__
Male
–
84
67
89
128
42

Female <10 10s 20s
–
–
–
–
29
4
7
8
8
0
1
4
29
1
8 11
42
3
8 29
15
0
0
1
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30s
–
16
5
25
40
0

40s
–
24
20
31
37
4

50s
–
34
19
25
27
12

60s 70s+
–
–
16
3
28
0
17
3
20
8
28 12
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